A winter in Smolensk, a sixth coalition TL

Part 1-Prelude
In 1812, Napoleon stood as the almost uncontested master of Europe. His former German enemies, Austria and Prussia, stood humiliated and all but vassalized by the French eagles, while Russia now stood in an alliance with Napoleon. There was still the bleeding ulcer of the Iberian peninsula, but that was of little concern to Napoleon by 1812. His main concern was the continental system, or more specifically its ineffectiveness. When he discovered that year that Russia had all but discarded the system (Which was simply due to the ruinous effect it was having on the Russian economy) The emperor was furious. Renouncing his friendship with Tsar Alexander, he prepared to bring his country back into the fold by force.

The forces assembled for such an undertaking were by a large margain the largest Europe had ever seen. Just under half a million men crossed the Neimen in late June, with many more reserve and support personel remaining behind. Generals Barclay and Bagration, supremely outnumbered, were forced to retreat. Almost immediately however, Napoleon's plan began to crumble. He'd entered Russia expecting an immediate battle with the Russian army, but instead, his lumbering beast of an army was forced to march through land razed bare by the reatreating forces. Cossack raids, typhus, and the summer heat, all wore down his inexperienced conscripts. The Russians did occasionally fight rearguard actions, the largest of which was at Smolensk in mid August, but the Grande Armée was too unwieldly to outmanuver them.

Several of Napoleon's Marshals advised him to halt the army at Smolensk, and continue the campaign next year, but he wouldn't hear it. The Emperor now hoped to force a peace by occupying the spritual heart of Russia, Moscow. At the same time, Alexander called up an old commander to face Napoleon, General Kutuzov. Wishing to avenge his famous defeat against Napoleon at Austerlitz, Kutuzov decided he'd make one stand outside Moscow, hoping to turn back the French tide. Deteachments and attrition now meant Napoleon barely had a numerical advantage, and Kutozov had ample time to prepare a defensive position. Less than a hundred miles from Moscow, the one eyed general would face off against the Corsican ogre one last time.
 
Part 2- Borodino
As the Grande Armée arrived on the 6th of September, it first cleared the forward redout at Sheverdino, which proved a worryingly bloody task. So few prisoners had been taken, a particularly troubling indication that the enemy's morale had not been broken. Marshal Davout, commander of I Corps, suggested outflanking the Russian positions. However Napoleon soundly denied this, partly because he thought it too risky, partly because he intended to destroy the Russian army here and now. By the next morning both forced had been deployed for battle, and an anxious night passed as the officers and men readied themselves for the carnage.

Napoleon's force numbered around 130,000 men, and 590 guns. His left flank was held by his stepson Eugéne's IV Corps, as well as General Grouchy's III Cavalry Corps. In the center, on the South bank of the Kalatsha was Junot's Westphalian VII Corps, Davout's I Corps, and Ney's III Corps. These were reinforced by three Cavalry Corps, under Nansouty, Latour, and Montbrun respectively. On the far right, Polish prince Poniatoski led his countrymen in V corps.

The Russian forces, while under the overall command of Kutozov with 120,000 men and 600 guns, were in fact part of two seperate armies. The North was held by General Barclay, with Baggovout's II Corps, Tolstoy's IV Corps, and Kaptzevich's VI Corps. His cavalry wing was formidable with three corps of conventional cavalry, as well as Platov's Cossacks. General Bagration held the left, as well as two major fortifications, the great redoubt in the center of the field, as the three Fleche (Arrows) in the South. He had under his command Tushkov's III Corps, Raievski's VII Corps, as well as Lavrov's guards in reserve, and a cavalry and Cossack Corps.

Kutuzov had planned to leave the tactical handling of the battle to his subordinates, but was forced to make on exception. Realizing that Napoleon would primarily fall on Bagration, he had Barclay send his right flank South, to act as a reserve. This decision would prove pivotal in the outcome of the battle. Napoleon wasn't very active either, partly due to the rough and confined area of the battlefield, preventing any grand manuvers. However the exhaustion of the campaign had also left him tired, and in no mood to command his forces. Whatever his reasons, Napoleon let his generals run the battle.

Shortly after dawn, Napoleon ordered the attack to begin. There were early successes, as V Corps advanced on the right towards the village of Utitza, and Eugéne cleared skirmishers from Borodino proper on the left. However, as the center advanced towards the Russian earthworks, they came under relentless russian fire. Despite being seriously wounded as his horse was killed under him, Marshal Davout led his corps uphill, managing to capture some of the earthworks. Bagration then personally led a counterattack, driving the French out. As Eugéne's artillery rained shells on the great redoubt, Russian casualties mounted.

By noon, little progress had been made in the center, despite the Poles taking Utitza to the south. IV Corps was forced to fend off an ambush by Platov, while Bagration and Barclay organized four Cavalry Corps into a massive attack on the French line. Murat gathered three Corps of his own, and led a massive duel on center flanks, as horsemen of all type and nationality clashed. Junot finally launched an attack on the great redoubt from the South, allowing Grouchy to get behind it from the North. Bagration led another counterattack, this time with grenadiers of the Russian Imperial Guard, and at the cost of his own life, managed to recapture it.

Throughout the day Napoleon received plea after plea from his generals, begging him to send in his own Imperial Guard. But the emperor, not wanting to destroy his last reserve, refused. By dusk, both sides were nearing exhuastion, and little progress had been made. The French cavalry was exhausted, their artillery running low on ammunition, but still the infantry hurled themselves into the Fleche, and each time were thrown back. As darkness finally ended the battle, both sides found themselves with around 40,000 casualties, but the Russian redoubts were still under their control. While there had been success on the flanks, Napoleon had failed to break Kutuzov. That night, Napoleon gave a rare order, his marshals were to meet with him, they had much to discuss...

(Note: The bold is the POD, Kutuzov never gave this order IOTL)
 
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As the Grande Armée arrived on the 6th of September, it first cleared the forward redout at Sheverdino, which proved a worryingly bloody task. So few prisoners had been taken, a particularly troubling indication that the enemy's morale had not been broken. Marshal Davout, commander of I Corps, suggested outflanking the Russian positions. However Napoleon soundly denied this, partly because he thought it too risky, partly because he intended to destroy the Russian army here and now. By the next morning both forced had been deployed for battle, and an anxious night passed as the officers and men readied themselves for the carnage.

Napoleon's force numbered around 130,000 men, and 590 guns. His left flank was held by his stepson Eugéne's IV Corps, as well as General Grouchy's III Cavalry Corps. In the center, on the South bank of the Kalatsha was Junot's Westphalian VII Corps, Davout's I Corps, and Ney's III Corps. These were reinforced by three Cavalry Corps, under Nansouty, Latour, and Montbrun respectively. On the far right, Polish prince Poniatoski led his countrymen in V corps.

The Russian forces, while under the overall command of Kutozov with 120,000 men and 600 guns, were in fact part of two seperate armies. The North was held by General Barclay, with Baggovout's II Corps, Tolstoy's IV Corps, and Kaptzevich's VI Corps. His cavalry wing was formidable with three corps of conventional cavalry, as well as Platov's Cossacks. General Bagration held the left, as well as two major fortifications, the great redoubt in the center of the field, as the three Fleche (Arrows) in the South. He had under his command Tushkov's III Corps, Raievski's VII Corps, as well as Lavrov's guards in reserve, and a cavalry and Cossack Corps.

Kutuzov had planned to leave the tactical handling of the battle to his subordinates, but was forced to make on exception. Realizing that Napoleon would primarily fall on Bagration, he had Barclay send his right flank South, to act as a reserve. This decision would prove pivotal in the outcome of the battle. Napoleon wasn't very active either, partly due to the rough and confined area of the battlefield, preventing any grand manuvers. However the exhaustion of the campaign had also left him tired, and in no mood to command his forces. Whatever his reasons, Napoleon let his generals run the battle.

Shortly after dawn, Napoleon ordered the attack to begin. There were early successes, as V Corps advanced on the right towards the village of Utitza, and Eugéne cleared skirmishers from Borodino proper on the left. However, as the center advanced towards the Russian earthworks, they came under relentless russian fire. Despite being seriously wounded as his horse was killed under him, Marshal Davout led his corps uphill, managing to capture some of the earthworks. Bagration then personally led a counterattack, driving the French out. As Eugéne's artillery rained shells on the great redoubt, Russian casualties mounted.

By noon, little progress had been made in the center, despite the Poles taking Utitza to the south. IV Corps was forced to fend off an ambush by Platov, while Bagration and Barclay organized four Cavalry Corps into a massive attack on the French line. Murat gathered three Corps of his own, and led a massive duel on center flanks, as horsemen of all type and nationality clashed. Junot finally launched an attack on the great redoubt from the South, allowing Grouchy to get behind it from the North. Bagration led another counterattack, this time with grenadiers of the Russian Imperial Guard, and at the cost of his own life, managed to recapture it.

Throughout the day Napoleon received plea after plea from his generals, begging him to send in his own Imperial Guard. But the emperor, not wanting to destroy his last reserve, refused. By dusk, both sides were nearing exhuastion, and little progress had been made. The French cavalry was exhausted, their artillery running low on ammunition, but still the infantry hurled themselves into the Fleche, and each time were thrown back. As darkness finally ended the battle, both sides found themselves with around 40,000 casualties, but the Russian redoubts were still under their control. While there had been success on the flanks, Napoleon had failed to break Kutuzov. That night, Napoleon gave a rare order, his marshals were to meet with him, they had much to discuss...

(Note: The bold is the POD, Kutuzov never gave this order IOTL)
And it could make a considerable difference (OTOH, it ended pretty much this way but more or less in a piecemeal fashion). 👍

But, to be fair, before the battle there was a fear that Napoleon would order his left flank to extend further to the left along the Kolocha. This would allow the French long range artillery (in this specific area Russian army had none) to keep firing along the Russian positions with a further opportunity to attack weakened Russian flank across the Kolocha with simultaneous attack on the front of the 1st Army. This would potentially cut the Russians from the New Smolensk Road (which they used in OTL for retreat) and make the whole situation quite lousy. This possibility was anticipated and there were field fortifications built on extreme right flank and at the 1st Army’s front. So, you are right with a benefit of a hindsight but Kutuzov also had valid reason for not ordering such a move. What is also (almost always) missing is that the Russian artillery reserve allegedly remained mostly unused. While in a long range fire the French had undisputed advantage, in a close range the Russians had an advantage both in the numbers and in a caliber (minimal caliber 6 pounds while the French had numerous 3 pounders). In OTL, as a result, not only the fleshes but the central battery as well had been under gunned (and the battery eventually run out of ammunition and personnel). But for Kutuzov saving artillery (something of a semi-religious importance in the Russian army) was among the top priorities and, unlike other reserves, this one was under his direct control.

I see that you preserved Bagration, which may cause problems in the immediate future: in OTL, with him out, Kutuzov joined the 1st and 2nd armies thus squeezing Barclay out and forcing him to leave the army. This left Kutuzov an only figure of an authority allowing to enforce his favorite “do as little as possible” modus operandi without any meaningful opposition. If Bagration is alive, then BOTH armies exist because playing the OTL trick to BOTH army commanders (Bagration was very popular) would be politically dangerous. And having both of them around would make Kutuzov’s own position more precarious and probably will also result in more aggressive Russian operations during the 2nd part of campaign. This is just my 2c worth and my perspective is not the only one possible.
 
Thanks for the imput, but one small correction, I also killed Bagration as in OTL. The key difference between the OTL battle, and mine is that here the Russians still hold their redoubts. Basically the French center made no progress, but still got mauled.
 
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Thanks for the imput, but one small correction, I also killed Bagration as in OTL.
Oops, sorry, I overlooked this. Then in that area you are in OTL situation.

The key difference between the OTL battle, and mine is that here the Russians still hold their redoubts. Basically the French center made no progress, but still got mauled.
Yes, I got that. Well (sorry, this is my favorite nitpicking subject), actually there were no “redoubts” as plural. There was a single redoubt at Shevardino, which was taken before the main battle (and which either Segur or Caulaincourt defined as ‘the redoubts’).
The rest of the fortifications, including Raevsky Battery, which the French by unknown reason called “Great Redoubt” were open on the rear. The battery had a wooden fence at the back but this did not really count and the Russians, AFAIK, never called it “redoubt”. 😂

IMO, this confusion was due to the fact that two main French eyewitnesses had not actually been on any of these spots during the battle and the reports from the spots could easily be on an exaggerating side.
 
Oops, sorry, I overlooked this. Then in that area you are in OTL situation.


Yes, I got that. Well (sorry, this is my favorite nitpicking subject), actually there were no “redoubts” as plural. There was a single redoubt at Shevardino, which was taken before the main battle (and which either Segur or Caulaincourt defined as ‘the redoubts’).
The rest of the fortifications, including Raevsky Battery, which the French by unknown reason called “Great Redoubt” were open on the rear. The battery had a wooden fence at the back but this did not really count and the Russians, AFAIK, never called it “redoubt”. 😂

IMO, this confusion was due to the fact that two main French eyewitnesses had not actually been on any of these spots during the battle and the reports from the spots could easily be on an exaggerating side.
Hey feel free to nitpick, I'll clearly need it for this TL
 
Part 3-Debate

September 7th, 1812, 2200.​



Marshal Davout finally stumbled into Napoleon's tent, the last General to arrive. He was met with Marshals Berthier, Murat, Ney, Bessierres, Mortier, and Lefebvre. Junot, Eugéne, and Poniatowski also flanked the emperor. "By god, what's happened to you?" Napoleon remarked dryly "Sire..." Davout gasped "My horse was hit by a cannon, and I took a ball through the arm. I can't believe I'm alive" He wasn't lying, he was shocked the surgeon said that nothing was mortal. Nonetheless he felt like death "In any case, we'll need you up for this, you're all going back in at dawn." The faces of most men in the men in the room fell.

Seeming to either not notice or not care Napoleon stood and paced over to a freshly drawn sketch of the battlefield "I see I was wrong to hold back the guard, no matter." He gazed at the paleing generals. "First, we'll have every gun blast the earthworks before dawn, Lefebvre, you'll lead the center, Mortier following. Behind all that Ney and Davout will take the center Junot and Eugéne on the flanks. Bessieres, you and Murat will take the far flanks." Davout sharply inhaled "No, sire."

"Hmm?" Napoleon's expression didn't change, but his eyes shot over to the iron marshal. "Sire we lost the guard twice over today, they won't take it." "They will for me, they've done it before." "Not like this sire, I was in the thick of it. You'll destroy your guard, and we'll be having this conversation again tomarrow." "Anyone else?" Not a man would look their emperor in the eye "Well, I didn't invite you all here to kiss me, what would you suggest?" Deavout motioned to a chair, and at Napoleon's nod fell into it "Assuming sire, that your objective is still Moscow?" "It is." "Bypass the fortifications, take the old road to the South through utitza, and we can outflank Bagration." Napoleon shushed him "And have the whole Russian army fall on us as we do, no. As I said it is too risky but then, you make a good argument. What do the rest of you say?"

No general spoke, though some nodded "Well then..." poised Napoleon "If we can't take the positions by noon tomarrow, Davout, I'll support you." Dejected, the generals slinked out of the tent, as Berthier got to work turning battered regiments into companies, and preparing for more late nights of the same...
 

September 7th, 1812, 2200.​



Marshal Davout finally stumbled into Napoleon's tent, the last General to arrive. He was met with Marshals Berthier, Murat, Ney, Bessierres, Mortier, and Lefebvre. Junot, Eugéne, and Poniatowski also flanked the emperor. "By god, what's happened to you?" Napoleon remarked dryly "Sire..." Davout gasped "My horse was hit by a cannon, and I took a ball through the arm. I can't believe I'm alive" He wasn't lying, he was shocked the surgeon said that nothing was mortal. Nonetheless he felt like death "In any case, we'll need you up for this, you're all going back in at dawn." The faces of most men in the men in the room fell.

Seeming to either not notice or not care Napoleon stood and paced over to a freshly drawn sketch of the battlefield "I see I was wrong to hold back the guard, no matter." He gazed at the paleing generals. "First, we'll have every gun blast the earthworks before dawn, Lefebvre, you'll lead the center, Mortier following. Behind all that Ney and Davout will take the center Junot and Eugéne on the flanks. Bessieres, you and Murat will take the far flanks." Davout sharply inhaled "No, sire."

"Hmm?" Napoleon's expression didn't change, but his eyes shot over to the iron marshal. "Sire we lost the guard twice over today, they won't take it." "They will for me, they've done it before." "Not like this sire, I was in the thick of it. You'll destroy your guard, and we'll be having this conversation again tomarrow." "Anyone else?" Not a man would look their emperor in the eye "Well, I didn't invite you all here to kiss me, what would you suggest?" Deavout motioned to a chair, and at Napoleon's nod fell into it "Assuming sire, that your objective is still Moscow?" "It is." "Bypass the fortifications, take the old road to the South through utitza, and we can outflank Bagration." Napoleon shushed him "And have the whole Russian army fall on us as we do, no. As I said it is too risky but then, you make a good argument. What do the rest of you say?"

No general spoke, though some nodded "Well then..." poised Napoleon "If we can't take the positions by noon tomarrow, Davout, I'll support you." Dejected, the generals slinked out of the tent, as Berthier got to work turning battered regiments into companies, and preparing for more late nights of the same...
Great chapter. Would Davout dare to openly contradict Napoleon instead of just offering his opinion? Of course, I’m strongly biased against him, but in the list above he was the only one with brains and military talent. Who, in his right mind would expect advice from Ney, Murat or Lefebvre? 😉

As an idle thought, Napoleon’s OTL obsession with Moscow was as much anti-Napoleonic as it is possible: his proclaimed principle was going for the opponent’s army, not a geographic points. So, judging by the title, you are going to make him more “napoleonic” than in OTL. And, rather distressingly, by doing so you are elevating Kutuzov (a complete a—hole) into a general who won a battle against Napoleon. The Russian historic tradition was going out of its way to define Borodino as Russian “moral victory”, etc. and here you go making it a real victory. How about at least both sides retreating, with the Council in Fili and Kutuzov’s decision to abandon Moscow, when during the retreat it is found that Napoleon is retreating as well? Oops, it looks like we are victorious after all. 😂
 
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Part 4- Meatgrinder
Napoleon was more attentive during the lead up to the second day of battle around Borodino. The scale of losses had been made more clear to him overnight, and he now understood that taking the fortifications would take more planning. Sleeping just two hours, he rose around 2am, and spent hours in the dark personally organizing a grand battery of 220 guns pointed at the fleche. Eugéne formed up his own battery of 60 guns, hoping to surpress the great redoubt for as long as possible. At 4am Napoleon ordered the bombardment to begin, many of the guns were still sighted correctly from yesterdays fighting, so despite the darkness accuracy was acceptable. Not only did this bombardment wake the Russians two hours earlier than the French, many overshooting and bouncing balls fell on troops bivouaced in the rear, one ball even tore through Barclay's tent while he slept, though he was unharmed.

The attack continued unopposed until dawn, when the Russian batteries began an uncoordinated counter barrage. The death of General Kutaisov the day prior meant that much of the Russian artillery was uncommited. Nonetheless Napoleon revised his plan slightly, hoping to crush the Russians here and now. Junot would advance through the woods South of the fleche, while Poniatowski kept up his advance, Ney and Davout would follow the guard to the fleche themselves, while Eugéne and Grouchy attacked the great redoubt. Between these two fortifcations, Bessiéres and Murat would lead all the available cavalry, to try and outflank the Russian positions.

By 8am, with the troops ready, the guard ate their breakfast at sheverdino, and marched sith the emperor to the battlefield. Morale was so low among the main army, that Marshal Ney reported five suicides that morning, and many of Davouts soldiers jeered at the intact and well groomed guard, who had no idea what they were marching into. At 8:45, Napoleon ordered the attack to begin, and the began its advance. The Russian artillery poured fire into the French ranks, but was again poorly coodinated, and the effect was at first minimal.

As the guard approached the fleche, light field guns loaded with case shot, and thousands of musketmen poured volleys into the packed ranks. The old guard briefly wavered, before Marshal Lefebvre urged them into the mass. Before long, three French and three Russian corps were rammed into one another, neither side yielding. In the South, V Corps was able to push back Tuchkov and the Moscow militia, but was caught off guard as a massive attack by Karpov's Cossacks forced them to fall back. In the North it was little better, as the Italian royal guard led an attack against the great redoubt that was thrown back with heavy losses.

By 10am the central fleche had been siezed, but repeated counterattacks caused casualties to soar. As Junot fought his way through Cossacks in the woods. Murat and Bessiéres led the guard cavalry, plus two other corps of horsemen, and charged into the fray. Platov and Korf led their cavalry in turn, and a massive whirling duel developed between the earthworks. The French and allied cavalry were able to beat back the Russian cavalry, but found nothing but squares of Russian infantry behind them. In an unusual manner of combat, some of these infantry supported a counterattack by Platov, and managed to wreak havoc on the French. Murat himself was dragged off his horse and nearly captured, before he was rescued by guard cavalry.

By noon, as little additional progress had been made, it was clear Napoleon did not have the strength to break the Russians. He kept up the attack anyway, but as the scale of damage to the imperial guard became clear, he finally ordered the attacks to stop at 1:45. To Davouts fury, he also recognized that outflanking the enemy was no longer possible either, as two Russian corps now stood on the old Smolensk road to the South. For another 35,000 French casualties and 30,000 Russian, Napoleon had achieved nothing.
 
Napoleon was more attentive during the lead up to the second day of battle around Borodino. The scale of losses had been made more clear to him overnight, and he now understood that taking the fortifications would take more planning. Sleeping just two hours, he rose around 2am, and spent hours in the dark personally organizing a grand battery of 220 guns pointed at the fleche. Eugéne formed up his own battery of 60 guns, hoping to surpress the great redoubt for as long as possible. At 4am Napoleon ordered the bombardment to begin, many of the guns were still sighted correctly from yesterdays fighting, so despite the darkness accuracy was acceptable. Not only did this bombardment wake the Russians two hours earlier than the French, many overshooting and bouncing balls fell on troops bivouaced in the rear, one ball even tore through Barclay's tent while he slept, though he was unharmed.

The attack continued unopposed until dawn, when the Russian batteries began an uncoordinated counter barrage. The death of General Kutaisov the day prior meant that much of the Russian artillery was uncommited. Nonetheless Napoleon revised his plan slightly, hoping to crush the Russians here and now. Junot would advance through the woods South of the fleche, while Poniatowski kept up his advance, Ney and Davout would follow the guard to the fleche themselves, while Eugéne and Grouchy attacked the great redoubt. Between these two fortifcations, Bessiéres and Murat would lead all the available cavalry, to try and outflank the Russian positions.

By 8am, with the troops ready, the guard ate their breakfast at sheverdino, and marched sith the emperor to the battlefield. Morale was so low among the main army, that Marshal Ney reported five suicides that morning, and many of Davouts soldiers jeered at the intact and well groomed guard, who had no idea what they were marching into. At 8:45, Napoleon ordered the attack to begin, and the began its advance. The Russian artillery poured fire into the French ranks, but was again poorly coodinated, and the effect was at first minimal.

As the guard approached the fleche, light field guns loaded with case shot, and thousands of musketmen poured volleys into the packed ranks. The old guard briefly wavered, before Marshal Lefebvre urged them into the mass. Before long, three French and three Russian corps were rammed into one another, neither side yielding. In the South, V Corps was able to push back Tuchkov and the Moscow militia, but was caught off guard as a massive attack by Karpov's Cossacks forced them to fall back. In the North it was little better, as the Italian royal guard led an attack against the great redoubt that was thrown back with heavy losses.

By 10am the central fleche had been siezed, but repeated counterattacks caused casualties to soar. As Junot fought his way through Cossacks in the woods. Murat and Bessiéres led the guard cavalry, plus two other corps of horsemen, and charged into the fray. Platov and Korf led their cavalry in turn, and a massive whirling duel developed between the earthworks. The French and allied cavalry were able to beat back the Russian cavalry, but found nothing but squares of Russian infantry behind them. In an unusual manner of combat, some of these infantry supported a counterattack by Platov, and managed to wreak havoc on the French. Murat himself was dragged off his horse and nearly captured, before he was rescued by guard cavalry.

By noon, as little additional progress had been made, it was clear Napoleon did not have the strength to break the Russians. He kept up the attack anyway, but as the scale of damage to the imperial guard became clear, he finally ordered the attacks to stop at 1:45. To Davouts fury, he also recognized that outflanking the enemy was no longer possible either, as two Russian corps now stood on the old Smolensk road to the South. For another 35,000 French casualties and 30,000 Russian, Napoleon had achieved nothing.
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Great chapter.

If you are interested in the gross details, fighting of the next day would have one more unpleasant aspect: both sides would have to deal with the previous day’s corpses, which were piling in front of the main fighting points. For example, the ditch in front of the Raevsky battery (“the big redoubt”) had been literally filled with the human and horses corpses. Something like that.

1690168077381.jpeg

So the fighting for both sides would involve, among other things, physical problem of marching/riding over the piles of corpses.
 
Part 5-Backtrack

September 8th, 1812, 2000​



Marshal Berthier was exhausted, and there seemed no end to the work before him. He was erasing regiments, shuffling companies of walking wounded. A hard fight always meant a bad night for the chief of staff, but this was worse. For months Berthier had masterminded the movement of a half million men, and watched as typhus and hunger ripped through them. Borodino was just faster, and he couldn t keep up.

"Well?" Napoleon paced his tent "Seems Eugéne made it out best, 10% casualties. Poniatowski lost 15%, his flank was chewed up. Ney Davout, Junot all took about 55% losses." "And my guard?" Asked Napoleon. "60% losses, I believe the old guard is down to two regiments" "Not my best play.." "No sire." Napoleon couldn't believe the guard had failed him. Maybe they're rusty... Napoleon thought They haven't been needed since Austerlitz, maybe I shouldn't have always held them back. In any case, there was work to do.

"Cavalry?" "1/3 casualties, but half the horses, beats me why. plus we'll need another quarter if you want to haul the wounded." "We can't stay here Berthier." The marshal nodded "No sire, we must winter in Smolensk, we can hold out there." Napoleon nodded as he continued to pace "We'll need to recall St Cyr and Oudinot, have them meet us there. Augereau needs to send in half his corps." "Half, sire?" "Yes we need to keep Prussia secure, keep our flanks secure. That means..." He quickly turned to face Berthier "Have Mortier replace Eugéne, and Bessiéres replace Murat. Send a message to the Rhine and Poland, we need more men." "Yes sire, and winter provisions?" Napoleon paused a moment "Oh yes, have Augereau send everthing we'll need. We leave tomarrow." As his aides scattered to carry this out his orders, Napoleon stepped out to see the stars

"And tell the empress she has my permission to pass the following conscription law in my absense..." Berthier growned, it would be a long night...
 

September 8th, 1812, 2000​



Marshal Berthier was exhausted, and there seemed no end to the work before him. He was erasing regiments, shuffling companies of walking wounded. A hard fight always meant a bad night for the chief of staff, but this was worse. For months Berthier had masterminded the movement of a half million men, and watched as typhus and hunger ripped through them. Borodino was just faster, and he couldn t keep up.

"Well?" Napoleon paced his tent "Seems Eugéne made it out best, 10% casualties. Poniatowski lost 15%, his flank was chewed up. Ney Davout, Junot all took about 55% losses." "And my guard?" Asked Napoleon. "60% losses, I believe the old guard is down to two regiments" "Not my best play.." "No sire." Napoleon couldn't believe the guard had failed him. Maybe they're rusty... Napoleon thought They haven't been needed since Austerlitz, maybe I shouldn't have always held them back. In any case, there was work to do.

"Cavalry?" "1/3 casualties, but half the horses, beats me why. plus we'll need another quarter if you want to haul the wounded." "We can't stay here Berthier." The marshal nodded "No sire, we must winter in Smolensk, we can hold out there." Napoleon nodded as he continued to pace "We'll need to recall St Cyr and Oudinot, have them meet us there. Augereau needs to send in half his corps." "Half, sire?" "Yes we need to keep Prussia secure, keep our flanks secure. That means..." He quickly turned to face Berthier "Have Mortier replace Eugéne, and Bessiéres replace Murat. Send a message to the Rhine and Poland, we need more men." "Yes sire, and winter provisions?" Napoleon paused a moment "Oh yes, have Augereau send everthing we'll need. We leave tomarrow." As his aides scattered to carry this out his orders, Napoleon stepped out to see the stars

"And tell the empress she has my permission to pass the following conscription law in my absense..." Berthier growned, it would be a long night...
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Just in case. Info, most of which you may already know but some items are rather obscure. I’m getting from “post-post” to “before-post”, hopefully, you do not mind. 😉

French:
  1. There was a big supply depot established in Smolensk.
  2. Big part of Smolensk had been burned during the battle and some of the remaining building had been used as the hospitals.
  3. In OTL there were big numbers of soldiers/deserters/strugglers/whoever going ahead of the orderly columns, who reached Smolensk first and pretty much destroyed the supplies by a brainless looting (flour thrown all over the ground, etc.) - garrison left was too small to prevent this.
  4. In OTL the retreating columns had been impeded by a huge train filled with all types of the useless (under the circumstances) loot. Only the Guards and Davout corps had properly organized baggage trains. On the top of this they had been taking with them big numbers of mostly civilian prisoners captured in Moscow. Add to this families of the officers, the French civilians picked up in Moscow, etc. Thousands of them made it all the way to Berezina. This ballast would be at least somewhat smaller.
  5. Cavalry horses already had been in a bad shape and prolonged staying near Moscow did not improve their condition. Seemingly was a byproduct of a general incompetence and beautiful but idiotic saddling.
  6. In OTL only horses of Napoleon’s household had the proper winter shoeing, the rest could not go on ice and had been either dying or left and then captured by the Russians who put them back to the service. Here the retreat started earlier and the French arrive to Smolensk before snow becomes a problem. However, close to the end of the year (in OTL in December) the weather turned really cold and the winter clothes and lodgings became an issue (#2).
  7. Usually, the French army was encamping either in the available houses or the soldiers had been making themselves some huts of branches and whatever available as protection against the rain. Napoleon held an opinion that the simple camp fires are better than the tents. This would become a big problem in December when the cold weather kicks in: with a big part of it being destroyed, Smolensk did not have enough accommodations and, Berthier not doing anything unless directly ordered and ditto for the corps commanders except Davout, it would take Napoleon himself changing his modus operandi and ordering barracks construction (materials, instruments, carpenters, etc.). OTOH, at least part of the troops could be placed in the nearby villages.

ITTL #2 and #7 are still problematic but with the rest the French are better off to the various degrees and the march to Smolensk could be conducted in a reasonably good order.

Russians:
  1. After Borodino the Russian army was not in condition to advance. ITTL situation is even worse. So the French could retreat not being pursued. Few Cossack and hussars parties would not be an issue for the orderly columns.
  2. Kutuzov is in a tricky position: on one hand he is a “victor at Borodino” and savior of Moscow. OTOH, the errr… “glorious victory” encourages numerous hotheads in the army and in the rear to demand immediate pursuit no matter what. Something he was reluctant to do in OTL and should be even more reluctant to do ITTL with the much greater losses and the troops in a much worse shape.
Hopefully, this will be helpful.
 
So, judging by the title, you are going to make him more “napoleonic” than in OTL. And, rather distressingly, by doing so you are elevating Kutuzov (a complete a—hole) into a general who won a battle against Napoleon.
If you and the Topic Starter don't mind a small derailing question, why the Kutuzov hate? His most recent biographer, Alexander Mikaberidze shows him in a generally positive light: personally courageous, hardworking, a talented diplomat and a decent general. Certainly not up to Napoleon's level, but that's a high bar. Something of an intriguer and womanizer, but that's par for the course in 18th century Russia. And the fact that Alexander I despised him must be in his favour somewhat.
 
If you and the Topic Starter don't mind a small derailing question, why the Kutuzov hate? His most recent biographer, Alexander Mikaberidze shows him in a generally positive light: personally courageous, hardworking, a talented diplomat and a decent general. Certainly not up to Napoleon's level, but that's a high bar. Something of an intriguer and womanizer, but that's par for the course in 18th century Russia. And the fact that Alexander I despised him must be in his favour somewhat.
I looked him up, and he seems a rare example of being good at logistics not making up for bad tactics. Yes he was popular, and he could organize and command a large force, but he was often passive, too cautious, and it bit him in the ass.
 
I looked him up, and he seems a rare example of being good at logistics not making up for bad tactics. Yes he was popular, and he could organize and command a large force, but he was often passive, too cautious, and it bit him in the ass.
I would amend that by saying that he was cautious against Napoleon, but not a poor tactician as such. He did very well against the Turks at the Battle of Slobozia. I do know the Turks in 1811 were not exactly a first rate army, but it was still a very imaginative battle of annihilation. Plus, Kutuzov managed the retreat of the Russian army after Ulm and prior to Austerlitz very well and had the right instincts throughout most of that campaign, with Alexander's foolishness leading to the disaster.
 
If you and the Topic Starter don't mind a small derailing question, why the Kutuzov hate? His most recent biographer, Alexander Mikaberidze shows him in a generally positive light: personally courageous, hardworking, a talented diplomat and a decent general. Certainly not up to Napoleon's level, but that's a high bar. Something of an intriguer and womanizer, but that's par for the course in 18th century Russia. And the fact that Alexander I despised him must be in his favour somewhat.
There are plenty of Kutuzov’s positive biographies, especially after Stalin “elevating” him into a military genius. 😜 BTW, not being an admirer does not automatically amounts to hate.

He was a rather typical courtier of CII period: intelligent, sly, and not overburdened by excessive sense of a self-respect: he (already a general) was famous for preparing Zubov’s morning coffee. Socially, he was connected by most of the Russian aristocracy and quite rich. This is important because his appointment in 1812 was to a big degree pushed through by that group and after appointment he kept surrounding himself by the members of that group regardless of their merits (or their absence).

Now, he was not personally a coward but as a military commander he was quite prominent by an absence of initiative.

The 1st famous example, storming Ismail: his column made it up the wall and he … sends Suvorov a message asking what to do next (what answer he expected? take a nap on a wall, go back to the camp) and moved forward only after receiving an answer “you are appointed commandant of Ismail”. What we see? Lack of initiative or a sly move to get a prestigious appointment? Or both?

2nd - Austerlitz campaign. He was a commander-in-chief but it looks like he considered his role rather advisory: he gives an advice, Alexander rejects it, he shrugs his shoulders and implement the orders. Finally, it comes to a battle. Decision to make it is Alexander’s. Disposition is written by an Austrian. Kutuzov, with his experience, could not fail to see that it is bad one but does not object. Day of a battle - he is trying to at least delay the engagement by waiting until all columns will arrive. Alexander reprimands him and he orders to start. Defeat does not matter as long as he can pass the blame to somebody else. Small wonder that Alexander did not like him: how could he, ending up on a receiving end of a (justified) criticism while everybody kept praising Kutuzov for his wisdom (and not criticizing for a lack of a backbone)?

3rd - 1812. As soon as he arrives to the army, he sends a report that everything is lost due to Barclay’s mismanagement. Borodino - does not change disposition (Clausewitz remarked that just moving the 2nd line few hundred steps back would eliminate its pre-engagement losses) and actually does very little during the battle. Most of the initiatives came from Barclay. Commander of the reserve artillery is killed but he surely had a deputy and still the reserve artillery was mostly not engaged. Why? Because if the artillery is safely evacuated after the battle, the defeat is not too serious (one of the Russian “rules of the game” at that time). Pretty much the only order given by Kutuzov was a somewhat mysterious raid pf the Uvarov’s and Platov’s cavalry. AFAIK, nobody could produce a clear description of the order for this maneuver in the terms of its purpose and it was a failure: Clausewitz, who participated in it, left a description which leaves little doubts that the commanders had no clue. After the battle - council in Fili. Done in a violation of the protocol by which the junior members present talk first (BTW, the participants list is confusing: some of those present should not be there and some of those who should, weren’t). Again, pretty much setts up Barclay and covers his posteriors.
Tarutino camp - a bright spot. He is in his element arranging for supplies, warm clothing, etc. But as soon as the counter-offensive starts Russian logistics is not much better than French with approximately the same casualties. By the end of campaign leftovers of the Russian army are in rugs and starving. At Berezina he let Napoleon out of the trap because his main goal was to ruin not Napoleon but Chichagov who dared to criticize him in public.
 
I would amend that by saying that he was cautious against Napoleon, but not a poor tactician as such. He did very well against the Turks at the Battle of Slobozia. I do know the Turks in 1811 were not exactly a first rate army, but it was still a very imaginative battle of annihilation. Plus, Kutuzov managed the retreat of the Russian army after Ulm and prior to Austerlitz very well and had the right instincts throughout most of that campaign, with Alexander's foolishness leading to the disaster.
All this is true but most of his praise was for the things he did not do or did badly.
 
2nd - Austerlitz campaign. He was a commander-in-chief but it looks like he considered his role rather advisory: he gives an advice, Alexander rejects it, he shrugs his shoulders and implement the orders. Finally, it comes to a battle. Decision to make it is Alexander’s. Disposition is written by an Austrian. Kutuzov, with his experience, could not fail to see that it is bad one but does not object. Day of a battle - he is trying to at least delay the engagement by waiting until all columns will arrive. Alexander reprimands him and he orders to start. Defeat does not matter as long as he can pass the blame to somebody else. Small wonder that Alexander did not like him: how could he, ending up on a receiving end of a (justified) criticism while everybody kept praising Kutuzov for his wisdom (and not criticizing for a lack of a backbone)?
But what could he have done? He made his opinions known, but it's not as though Alexander would have listened, even had Kutuzov been more forceful. He could have resigned of course, but that would not have changed anything either. Mikaberidze cites General Langeron: "When [Kutuzov] asked to be involved in the planning, the Emperor bluntly told him, "That is none of your business."

I do appreciate that I am basing my views on one work, but at least I can say that Mikaberidze is neither a Stalinist-Burn-Down-London-Patriot nor a Tolstoy-ist (Tolstoyean?)

I do agree with you that Kutuzov's treatment of Barclay was very shabby and damages his reputation substantially. Barclay strikes me as the right man at the wrong time. If he had the confidence of the officer corps and society in 1812, I think he would have done at least as well as Kutuzov and probably better, and I am sure he would have done better than Wittgenstein in 1813.
 
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