Belle Epoque alliance system without the Habsburg Empire

[Eurofed]

One scenario which I find quite interesting and which saw some recent discussion sees the partecipation of Austria in the Franco-Prussian War. This inevitably makes it expand in a Prussia-Italy-Russia vs. France-Austria general war (Russia does so because of existing secret Russo-Prussian alliance accords for such a contingency), which all but surely would cause a defeat of France even worse than OTL and the collapse and partition of the Habsburg empire between Germany, Italy, Russia, and an independent Hungary. See the linked threads for an extensive discussion of how and why this scenario may come into being.

It would also in all likelihood cause the swift formation of a German-Italian-Hungarian Central Powers/Triple Alliance block that, differently from the OTL version, would be very stable, since the Austro-Italian antagonism is gone and the interests of the three partners are complementary. France, in all likelihood is going to have a foreign policy quite similar to OTL, except that ITTL it expands its revanchist enmity to the German-Italian bloc.

Short of very unlikely butterflies, these two poles of the European alliance system are all but made fixed by the initial events of the scenario. The really interesting and seemingly open-ended geopolitical issue is how the other European great powers, Britain and Russia, would align in the alliance system of this scenario.

For simplicity, we may assume that in all likelihood the United States shall keep their isolationist attitude and the Ottomans shall ally with the side opposite to Russia, although of course things might go differently.

Which alliance system do you see as most likely to emerge ?

 

[Douglas]

I disagree with the tenets of your original premise, so it's difficult to say, but assuming that Italy miraculously made gains at the expense of France in 1870, and the Germans were perfectly happy to watch a Great Power obliterated for the benefit of Russia and Italy, I would say that a Russia-Italy-Germany v. UK-France alliance is most plausible in the short-term, with Italy eventually bowing out since her economy would be obliterated by long-term opposition to both the UK and France.

Russia and Germany no longer have any issues to separate them in this instance. A Germany which is content to have the Austrian Empire dismembered is not one which is going to go to any lengths on behalf of whatever Hungarian rump comes out of the mess, leaving Russia a free hand in the Balkans (and, therefore, obviously opposed to the UK and Ottomans).

 

[LordKalvan]

I disagree with the tenets of your original premise, so it's difficult to say, but assuming that Italy miraculously made gains at the expense of France in 1870, and the Germans were perfectly happy to watch a Great Power obliterated for the benefit of Russia and Italy, I would say that a Russia-Italy-Germany v. UK-France alliance is most plausible in the short-term, with Italy eventually bowing out since her economy would be obliterated by long-term opposition to both the UK and France.

Russia and Germany no longer have any issues to separate them in this instance. A Germany which is content to have the Austrian Empire dismembered is not one which is going to go to any lengths on behalf of whatever Hungarian rump comes out of the mess, leaving Russia a free hand in the Balkans (and, therefore, obviously opposed to the UK and Ottomans).

I've really a lot of difficulties in following your reasoning.

First of all, A-H would be partitioned as a result either of an ill-advised participation in the Franco-German-Italian war (the entry in the war will activate the secret Russo-German compact of 1868) or will implode sometimes in the 1870s, whenever the Balkan crisis gets hotter and its internal contradictions push it beyond the point of non return.
My money is on the former scenario, btw.
Why should Germany (or better Prussia, under the mantle of the German empire) give a fig for the conservation of a multi-national dinastic construct that has declared war twice in less than 5 years, and before that had consistently contested Prussian hegemony in Germany?
Even IOTL (i.e. with a different development of the 1866 war) Bismarck's decision to align with A-H and Russia in the Dreikaiserbund was proven a major miscalculation: ultimately Germany found itself in the worst possible position. having alienated both Russia and Great Britain at the same time and in an alliance where the other two partners hated each other. Well done, I say.

There should be also no surprise in Italy getting its slice of meat out of the Italo-Franco-German war of 1870: ITTL Italy has come out with a significantly better perdormance from the war of 1866 (which is effectively the POD of TTL). Better Italian self-esteem and self-reliance together with a more realistic appraisal of strategic opportunities by Bismarck would result in a reconfirmation of the alliance, and a joint participation in the war against France (the spark for which might be either the Roman question or Luxembourg, or a bit of both together with Nappy's internal troubles).
While I do anticipate that Italy will make most of its actions against Austria (the Franco-Italian border is quite difficult for military operations in either direction), as a minimum Italy's hostility will force France to keep the border fully manned (and at best Nappy might get in his mind to attack ).

As far as the hypothetical alliances in Europe post Austria demise, I do not expect anything firm to coalesce before the late 1880s-early 1890s.
I also believe that the Italo-German alliance (plus the Hungarian appendix) should avoid at any cost an alliance with Russia.
The optimal solution would be a formal alliance with the British; second best is an informal situation where I-G and UK share similar aims (chief among them the preservation of the Ottoman empire, the containment of the revanchist France - in whichever form they come out of the defeat - and the containment of Russia's imperial aspiration in Asia.
The inter-alliance and Ottoman markets will work very well for Italian economy, and in neither of the most likely scenarios is UK hostile.

 

[I Blame Communism]

I agree with Douglas, and I'd stress that "fixed" nothing. Nobody wanted to make a binding alliance to anybody else, they were all backed into it: Austria was too big to fail and Germany was deeply invested in her survival, and France and Russia came to rely on one-another for protection, but there's no reason for the Italians to up and decide that they'll stick by Germany or vice-versa.

First of all, A-H would be partitioned as a result either of an ill-advised participation in the Franco-German-Italian war (the entry in the war will activate the secret Russo-German compact of 1868) or will implode sometimes in the 1870s, whenever the Balkan crisis gets hotter and its internal contradictions push it beyond the point of non return.
My money is on the former scenario, btw.

I wish people would stop acting like Austria could fall over on demand. An attempt at a Croation uprising in the 1870s was about as succesful as Young Ireland.

Why should Germany (or better Prussia, under the mantle of the German empire) give a fig for the conservation of a multi-national dinastic construct that has declared war twice in less than 5 years, and before that had consistently contested Prussian hegemony in Germany?

Same reason they did before in 1866: they were led by Bismarck, a man sufficiently canny to realise that it was better to leave Austria alone than face the choice between deploying Pommeranian grenadiers in the Balkans or letting the Russians have them.

The smart thing to do was to make sure Austria was unable to defy Germany in the pinch... which of course is pretty much what Bismarck was aiming at when he stuck his conk into the constitutional crisis of Bohemia in the 1870s.

Even IOTL (i.e. with a different development of the 1866 war) Bismarck's decision to align with A-H and Russia in the Dreikaiserbund was proven a major miscalculation: ultimately Germany found itself in the worst possible position. having alienated both Russia and Great Britain at the same time and in an alliance where the other two partners hated each other. Well done, I say.

That was after Bismarck left: I'm not convinced that he was some infallible diplomat who could have kept up his game forever, but he had nothing to do with Germany's rashness in the early 20th century. That arose from a weak kaiser with silly ideas and a weird internal political situation.

Circa 1900, Germany was on reasonable terms with Russia and Britain. And not so hostile terms with France, come to that, but everyone wants to think of the entire period after 1871 as the overture to WW1, it seems.

The optimal solution would be a formal alliance with the British; second best is an informal situation where I-G and UK share similar aims (chief among them the preservation of the Ottoman empire, the containment of the revanchist France - in whichever form they come out of the defeat - and the containment of Russia's imperial aspiration in Asia.

Couple of problems here...

1) Revanchist France? Boulanger was a real Revanche, and I reckon even he would have been more cautious had he actually gotten power. The revanches were a loud political interest-group who had to be appeased - hence why "Of course!, as soon as you publicly announce your acceptance of German Alsace" was Bismarck's all-purpose phrase for turning down French overtures and yes, France made overtures, chiefly over Egypt - but the Republic was run by sober middle-class statesmen who were deathly afraid that another war would mean 1) Losing (and the more they've been whalloped in the previous round, the truer this is) 2) another Commune and 3) the collapse of bourgeois civilisation.

2) Germany was actually pretty keen on Russian aspiration in Asia: look at the Triple Intervention. The R-J war seen by some of the New Course lot as the time to step to Russia's rescue by mediating and claim their reward (they were of course as surprised as anybody when the Japanese won on points without Britain becoming involved). And why not? Germany had no interests in Manchuria, and the more Russia was pursuing Asian empires the less she cared about the Balkans, which suited Germany fine. The Russian adventure in the Far East happens to be a time of exceptional tranquility in Austro-Russian relations.

 

[Douglas]

Snip

Short-term, the UK sees Russia as the major threat. Long-term, the UK sees Germany as the major threat.

Short-term and long-term, France sees Germany and Italy as the major threats.

Short-term and long-term, Germany sees France as the major threat.

Short-term and long-term, Italy sees France as the major threat but depends on both France and the United Kingdom economically.

Short-term, Russia sees the UK/Ottomans as the major threat; political developments in Germany may affect the long-term (lebensraum, etc).

FR - GE - GE
GE - FR - FR
IT - FR - FR [DEPENDENT ON ENEMIES]
OT - RU/IT - RU/IT
RU - UK - UK
UK - RU - GE

Short term:

France and Germany opposed. Italy aligns with Germany as earlier. Russia vs UK and Ottomans. Which is more likely:

FR-RU v GE-IT-UK

or

FR-UK v GE-IT-RU?

Given the existence of the League of the Three Emperors in OTL (conservative monarchs united), and Russian acquiescence in any Austria-Hungarian partition, it seems as if the latter is more likely in the short term (1870-1890).

Long term:

France and Germany opposed. UK opposed to Germany dominating Europe economically. Italy forced by economic warfare with France (as IOTL) to cease belligerence, occupies a neutral status. Depending on Russia's attitude, that leaves us with either

FR-UK v GE-RU [IT undecided]

or

FR-UK-RU v GE [IT undecided]

Either way you cut it, Germany and the United Kingdom are going to end up on separate sides of any alliance structure in the long-term with an even greater likelihood than OTL; the UK went to war with Germany when it seemed as if it would upset the balance of power in Europe, how much more so when Germany is even more economically and militarily predominant? Even with no war, some uber-alliance in Europe was never the UK's goal, the balance of power was.

 

[Douglas]

I'd also like to second IBC's comment above. Austria-Hungary wasn't a pushover waiting to happen. The weakest power in Europe (aside from the Ottomans, and depending on your viewpoint) was Italy, not Austria-Hungary.

 

[LordKalvan]

<snip>

Well, this is OTL, and in either of the long-term scenarios you propose (Germany alone against the Entente or Germany-Russia against France-UK-Ottomans) Germany has bought a losing ticket: in the "alone" scenario there is no way they can survive, and in the other one the more successful Russia is the more Germany will become the junior partner of the alliance.

There is no League of Three Emperors ITTL.

Germany will replace France as major economical partner, and - as I said - the internal alliance markets will be a good boost for Italian economy; and the same will be the Ottoman empire.

Which leads to my other point: instead of propping up Austria, Italy and Germany prop up the Ottomans and their Balkan possessions. What better way to keep the Russians out and to leave to another guy the thankless task of policing the Balkans? IMHO OTL has clearly shown what happened when the Balkans were given (a limited) independence.

Finally there is no reason why Germany and UK should by necessity be on opposite sides. No reason except the Wilhelmine stupidity, obviously: but the seeds of disaster were sown by Bismarck in the fatal 20 years between the crisis of Luxembourg and the Congress of Berlin.

BTW, the main reason for the British-German hostility was the naval buildup; and anyway even in August 1914 the declaration of war took 4 days to be issued (and IMHO if the Belgian neutrality had not been infringed, UK would have stayed out of the fray). The obsession with the continental balance of power belongs to a different era.

 

[Douglas]

Well, this is OTL, and in either of the long-term scenarios you propose (Germany alone against the Entente or Germany-Russia against France-UK-Ottomans) Germany has bought a losing ticket: in the "alone" scenario there is no way they can survive, and in the other one the more successful Russia is the more Germany will become the junior partner of the alliance.

There is no League of Three Emperors ITTL.

Yeah, I figured that out. The same reasoning for keeping on good terms with Russia will still be there.

Germany will replace France as major economical partner, and - as I said - the internal alliance markets will be a good boost for Italian economy; and the same will be the Ottoman empire.

Get back to me when you're finished waving your hands. Seriously, do you not realize how that sounds? "Country X will instead be economic partners with Z instead of Y." This isn't Risk. Italy's agrarian economy (57% rural still by 1913) will suffer from cheaper American and Far Eastern substitutes, it will raise tariffs to cope, and it will be further crushed down by tariff wars because it can't play with the big boys, no matter if it fancifully stops trading with France because it would be cooler for it to maintain an alliance with Germany.

Which leads to my other point: instead of propping up Austria, Italy and Germany prop up the Ottomans and their Balkan possessions. What better way to keep the Russians out and to leave to another guy the thankless task of policing the Balkans? IMHO OTL has clearly shown what happened when the Balkans were given (a limited) independence.

What reason would Germany have for propping up the Ottomans in 1871? Also, I suspect your argument would have more merit if you weren't suggesting that Italy and Germany act in 1871 as if they had the hindsight 2011 provides us with.

Finally there is no reason why Germany and UK should by necessity be on opposite sides. No reason except the Wilhelmine stupidity, obviously: but the seeds of disaster were sown by Bismarck in the fatal 20 years between the crisis of Luxembourg and the Congress of Berlin.

Right. The UK was just coincidentally opposed to the leading military and industrial power in Europe for hundreds of years. How serious would you take me if I took a 1789 POD and suggested that Napoleon didn't necessarily have to be on the opposite side as the UK during the Napoleonic wars?

BTW, the main reason for the British-German hostility was the naval buildup; and anyway even in August 1914 the declaration of war took 4 days to be issued (and IMHO if the Belgian neutrality had not been infringed, UK would have stayed out of the fray). The obsession with the continental balance of power belongs to a different era.

The British and French had been coming together for over a decade before WW1; it wasn't just about Belgium, and saying that it was goes against a huge body of scholarly opinion.

 

[RyuDrago]

I want to propose a triple entent UK-France-Italy vs central block Germany-Russia-great Hungary, with neutral Ottoman Empire... ( but maybe pushed more towards UK...)

 

[Douglas]

I want to propose a triple entent UK-France-Italy vs central block Germany-Russia-great Hungary, with neutral Ottoman Empire... ( but maybe pushed more towards UK...)

This is one of the two plausible end-states, in my opinion.

 

[Earling]

Echoing the comments, I think a partition of the Habsburgs is highly unlikely unless this 1870 war is on a scale approaching WW1 or atleast the Napoleonic wars, in which case the social consequences are going to be significant as to probably completely change Europe from OTL.

Still, to skip over this, you really need a map of this partitioned Austria. Does Germany annex the German-Austrian territories? What about Bohemia? Would the Russians allow this? If no (why would they?) do you end up with the somewhat artificial borders of OTL in 1918?

I think the most likely conclusion, barring German diplomatic brilliance, is an everyone versus German coalition, complicated by a few oddities on the periphery. With double the population of France, and far more wealth than Russia, Germany is now undisputed continental hegemon. Any illusions that this wasn't the case for OTL are gone in this TL. Since this would be obvious to just about everyone I doubt the powers would let this happen without a major war.

Allowing that it does happen I think it fair to say the British will oppose Germany, the French will oppose Germany and the Russians will oppose Germany. Italy could become Germany's camp follower but economic and strategic realities (in both trade and war she is going to be far more dependent upon her coast on the Med than over the Alps) are likely to stand opposed. Italy shall probably have ambitions over "Yugoslavia" which may well prove problematic if the states of this region are to be German allys. Making them Russia's allies might push them into the German camp. Hungary too could become a follower of Germany, although being caught between the Russians, Germans and Ottomans she is in a somewhat precarious state.

 

[Eurofed]

I agree with Douglas, and I'd stress that "fixed" nothing. Nobody wanted to make a binding alliance to anybody else, they were all backed into it: Austria was too big to fail and Germany was deeply invested in her survival, and France and Russia came to rely on one-another for protection, but there's no reason for the Italians to up and decide that they'll stick by Germany or vice-versa.

Binding in the sense that the OTL Austro-German alliance or the Dual Entente were binding, of course. No more, no less. To say that Austria was "too big to fail" is laughably untrue, since, as much as I loathe the Versailles settlement, European civilization did not collapse with the fall of the Habsburg, and its survival was no existential need of Germany.

Douglas' first post (as much as it was forcibly brought to my attention by LK's quoting, since he's on my ignore list, and generally there's a damn good reason for it) shows too much misunderstanding (or willful ignorance) of the scenario to be taken seriously.

I wish people would stop acting like Austria could fall over on demand.

I wish people would stop acting like Austria was immortal or a necessary part of civilization, and be so much the obstructionist naysayers on this board.

Same reason they did before in 1866: they were led by Bismarck, a man sufficiently canny to realise that it was better to leave Austria alone than face the choice between deploying Pommeranian grenadiers in the Balkans or letting the Russians have them.

To exercise some indirect influence-projection in the Balkans and limit Russian influence there (assuming that Germany decides this is necessary) would be at worst a relatively minor foreign policy chore, not an existential need. And it is surely much, much less troublesome politically and strategically than spare again a state that has shown itself hostile twice in a half a decade, and whose blood your public opinion is howling for. I shall believe Austria can survive this scenario when I see Germany being allowed to keep its 1941 borders with a 1944-45 PoD.

Circa 1900, Germany was on reasonable terms with Russia and Britain. And not so hostile terms with France, come to that, but everyone wants to think of the entire period after 1871 as the overture to WW1, it seems.

Re. Germany and France, sure they had their detente moments during 1871-1914, but detente and alliance are two different things.

1) Revanchist France? Boulanger was a real Revanche, and I reckon even he would have been more cautious had he actually gotten power. The revanches were a loud political interest-group who had to be appeased - hence why "Of course!, as soon as you publicly announce your acceptance of German Alsace" was Bismarck's all-purpose phrase for turning down French overtures and yes, France made overtures, chiefly over Egypt - but the Republic was run by sober middle-class statesmen who were deathly afraid that another war would mean 1) Losing (and the more they've been whalloped in the previous round, the truer this is) 2) another Commune and 3) the collapse of bourgeois civilisation.

Notice that this poll and discussion is about the most likely TTL Belle Epoque alliance system, not whether it would lead to a WWI, which is a quite worthwhile and interesting but separate topic.

2) Germany was actually pretty keen on Russian aspiration in Asia: look at the Triple Intervention. The R-J war seen by some of the New Course lot as the time to step to Russia's rescue by mediating and claim their reward (they were of course as surprised as anybody when the Japanese won on points without Britain becoming involved). And why not? Germany had no interests in Manchuria, and the more Russia was pursuing Asian empires the less she cared about the Balkans, which suited Germany fine. The Russian adventure in the Far East happens to be a time of exceptional tranquility in Austro-Russian relations.

Fair point.

 

[Eurofed]

Echoing the comments, I think a partition of the Habsburgs is highly unlikely unless this 1870 war is on a scale approaching WW1 or atleast the Napoleonic wars, in which case the social consequences are going to be significant as to probably completely change Europe from OTL.

Neither OTL partition of Poland did nor TTL partition of the Habsburg Empire would lead to the downfall of the European civilization. ITTL the Habsburg empire made a very foolish but plausible foreign policy gamble and it explodes in its face, in a way that makes its downfall inevitable. Its assets are divided between Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Russia; Germany and Russia get somewhat stronger, Italy rises to take the place of Austria in the great powers' game, Hungary becomes a regional power, the game endures.

Still, to skip over this, you really need a map of this partitioned Austria. Does Germany annex the German-Austrian territories? What about Bohemia? Would the Russians allow this? If no (why would they?) do you end up with the somewhat artificial borders of OTL in 1918?

Germany gets German Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, South Tyrol, and Slovenia. Russia gets Galicia and Bukovina (perhaps Transcarpathia too). Italy gets Trentino, Austrian Littoral, and Dalmatia. Hungary keeps Slovakia, Transylvania, and a federal union with Croatia-Slavonia. 1870 Russia didn't care about Czech irredentism.

I think the most likely conclusion, barring German diplomatic brilliance, is an everyone versus German coalition, complicated by a few oddities on the periphery. With double the population of France, and far more wealth than Russia, Germany is now undisputed continental hegemon. Any illusions that this wasn't the case for OTL are gone in this TL. Since this would be obvious to just about everyone I doubt the powers would let this happen without a major war.

Real countries are not strategy-games AI ones, bound by software to automatically gang up on a rising hegemon, regardless of circumstances. There is always going to be some other junior or regional powers that align with the rising star, because their respective interests are compementary, or because they opportunistically expect to profit from cooperation, or because they have a greater enmity with a third power that is also inimical to the rising star. OvB's Germany was far from being overly aggressive. The partition of the Habsburg empire does not overturn the European balance of power: Britain stands unchanged, Russia becomes a bit stronger, Germany significantly stronger but not overwhelmingly so (in different ways, Britain and Russia still match it), France is weakened but not destroyed, Italy rises to take the place of Austria, the Ottomans are unchanged. The dance continues to a slightly different music.

And which "powers" ought to oppose this partition ? Russia is a partner to the enterprise, which does not harm its interests. France has German-Italian troops deployed from Paris to Marseilles, and it is powerless to save itself, much less its fallen ally. Britain thinks this whole affair was the fault of Napoleon III, in this period imperial issues are its main concern, and this outcome adjusts, but not destroys the balance of power (if anything, they shall rush to court the German-Italian rising stars and try to stop them from getting too friendly to Russia; in this day and age, to stop unbridled Russian expansion in the Balkans-Central Asia belt was what Britain cared most about Europe). America certainly doesn't care about the demise of an European monarchy.

Italy could become Germany's camp follower but economic and strategic realities (in both trade and war she is going to be far more dependent upon her coast on the Med than over the Alps) are likely to stand opposed.

Trade patterns do change over time. Since the Italian unification, economic ties of Italy with Germany have been steadily growing, to the relative diminishing of the ones with France and Britain, and the German and Italian economies, strongly complementary to begin with, have become very interwined. TTL would substantially accelerate and intensify the process. As it concerns war, IOTL Italy fought Britain for three years and did not collapse till America threw its weight in. The assumption that Italy cannot and would not dare fight the Entente under any circumstances is provenly false.

 

[I Blame Communism]

The British and French had been coming together for over a decade before WW1; it wasn't just about Belgium, and saying that it was goes against a huge body of scholarly opinion.

In fact, if I'm not wrong, the Germans invaded Belgium precisely because they reckoned Britain was going to become involved anyway so they might as well do a heavy one on France.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Binding in the sense that the OTL Austro-German alliance or the Dual Entente were binding, of course. No more, no less.

I objected to the word "fixed". Alliances change, especially those which aren't based partly on political considerations like the Austro-German alliance.

To say that Austria was "too big to fail" is laughably untrue, since, as much as I loathe the Versailles settlement, European civilization did not collapse with the fall of the Habsburg, and its survival was no existential need of Germany.

Tsar and kaiser toppled, Germany a republic with socialists running around waving red flags in the streets, a revolutionary Marxist regime, Prussian estates expropriated by a Polish ex-socialist-terrorist, the king of the sheep-stealers and Bohemian peasants carving up the Austrian empire between them, and everything's fine?

Let's try and think ourselves into the mind of Bismarck a wee bit, hmm?

Douglas' first post (as much as it was forcibly brought to my attention by LK's quoting, since he's on my ignore list, and generally there's a damn good reason for it) shows too much misunderstanding (or willful ignorance) of the scenario to be taken seriously.

Either ignore him or respond to him. Bad form to tell him a) he's wrong and b) he is beneath being told why.

I wish people would stop acting like Austria was immortal or a necessary part of civilization, and be so much the obstructionist naysayers on this board.

I repeat: I keep naysaying your scenarios because they keep being the same, politically motivated, and none too plausible. I try not to be a naysayer, but as I say, people sometimes (often) act like Austria was held together by jammy luck.

To exercise some indirect influence-projection in the Balkans and limit Russian influence there (assuming that Germany decides this is necessary) would be at worst a relatively minor foreign policy chore, not an existential need.

This stuff isn't measured on a spectrum. So, the Russians invade Bulgaria. Are you going to urge moderation or not? If the Russians aren't going to moderate, what are you going to do? It's not a chore, its a possible war.

And it is surely much, much less troublesome politically and strategically than spare again a state that has shown itself hostile twice in a half a decade, and whose blood your public opinion is howling for. I shall believe Austria can survive this scenario when I see Germany being allowed to keep its 1941 borders with a 1944-45 PoD.

Overblown comparisons to the max! Nicely ironic that we're drawing comparisons to situations arising from total war in relation to the policies of a man who's whole system was supposed to prevent total war.

Re. Germany and France, sure they had their detente moments during 1871-1914, but detente and alliance are two different things.

There we go again. I didn't say they were allied, but the word 'detente' belongs to the Cold War. There have been states of cold war before the Cold War (Elizabethan England against Spain, say), but 19th century Franco-German relations were not among them.

Notice that this poll and discussion is about the most likely TTL Belle Epoque alliance system, not whether it would lead to a WWI, which is a quite worthwhile and interesting but separate topic.

Point stands, however: describing the Third Republic as "revanchist" is a tired old cliche.

 

[archaeogeek]

There is no way Britain will side with mega-germany because they will clash on colonies and still be seen as a naval upstart.

Either ignore him or respond to him. Bad form to tell him a) he's wrong and b) he is beneath being told why.

Yes, but it's not like it's out of character for him.

Neither OTL partition of Poland did nor TTL partition of the Habsburg Empire would lead to the downfall of the European civilization. ITTL the Habsburg empire made a very foolish but plausible foreign policy gamble and it explodes in its face, in a way that makes its downfall inevitable. Its assets are divided between Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Russia; Germany and Russia get somewhat stronger, Italy rises to take the place of Austria in the great powers' game, Hungary becomes a regional power, the game endures.

Poland, at the time of the partitions, was a secondary power with almost no relevance in foreign matters, and the loss of Poland in the french diplomatic system actually did cause problems and wound up being one of the reasons for the alliance reversals which created a Bourbon-Habsburg system of alliances replacing the old french system. Austria-Hungary is still a great power.

 

[I Blame Communism]

I'd add that people often act like the German fleet was Wilhelm personally waving his tonker at the British Empire. As a matter of fact, it became the focus of a national campaign by the jingos - because the German middle-classes aspired to martial glory and the army was run by junkers.

 

[Lord Douglas]

I'd add that people often act like the German fleet was Wilhelm personally waving his tonker at the British Empire. As a matter of fact, it became the focus of a national campaign by the jingos - because the German middle-classes aspired to martial glory and the army was run by junkers.

In fact the aristocrats were often keen to prevent expansion of the military because it would dilute the percentage of Junkers in the officer corps.

 

[DrakeRlugia]

Neither OTL partition of Poland did nor TTL partition of the Habsburg Empire would lead to the downfall of the European civilization. ITTL the Habsburg empire made a very foolish but plausible foreign policy gamble and it explodes in its face, in a way that makes its downfall inevitable. Its assets are divided between Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Russia; Germany and Russia get somewhat stronger, Italy rises to take the place of Austria in the great powers' game, Hungary becomes a regional power, the game endures.

The Polish Commonwealth upon it's partition was a country who had been decline since the late 17th century and whose political structure had been paralyzed throughout the 18th century. Even before it's dissolution, it was very clear that Poland continued to exist at the whim of it's neighbors, most especially Russia. de facto, the country was a Russian protectorate, even under the Wettin kings, a fact that was solidified when Poland was forced to accept Poniatowski by Russian bayonets, and when the Sejm was basically lorded over by the Russian ambassador. It's disappearance made no difference in the European game because it basically solidified a political reality that had already existed for a century. While there are certainly some similarities between the late-Habsburg empire and the Polish Commonwealth, the two situations are not the same and the partition of Austria would not proceed as the Polish one had.

Was Austria a country past it's prime? Certainly. But was it moribund? No. Despite ethnic troubles, Austria-Hungary had one of the fastest growing economies in Europe, with GNP growth of about 1.76% per year between 1870 and 1913. This matches up to Britain (1%), France (1.06%) and Germany (1.51%). While it still lagged between the west, like Russia, the Austro-Hungarian economy was growing at a rapid pace. Manufactures were springing up in Prague and Vienna, while a strong agriculture and food industry sprung up in Hungary: rapid economic growth sprung out into the Hungarian plains. While there are some similarities between the Polish Sejm and the Austrian political system, I wouldn't say they were the same. Yes, Austria's political system was certainly paralyzed to an extent by ethnic squabbles in the Austrian Parliament, and Hungary seeking to milk the most out of the autonomy (and gain even more! Each Ausgleich saw the Hungarians become even more demanding, making the Ausgleich seem like a short term solution and nothing more, in my opinion).

I don't even say this as a "Habsburg loyalist." Nor do I believe she is immortal or neccessary. But it's unlikely for her to be partitioned in 1866 or 1870 like Poland in 1794. Similar situations, but with very many differences.

Germany gets German Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, South Tyrol, and Slovenia. Russia gets Galicia and Bukovina (perhaps Transcarpathia too). Italy gets Trentino, Austrian Littoral, and Dalmatia. Hungary keeps Slovakia, Transylvania, and a federal union with Croatia-Slavonia. 1870 Russia didn't care about Czech irredentism.

But to discuss the scenario nevertheless...

The Russians would not get Transcarpathia, however. Why would Germany and Russia antagonize a potential of their bloc by chopping away a portion of the Kingdom of Hungary. Sure you can argue it is not even ethnically Hungarian, but it forms a portion of the Crown of St. Stephen. Russia's not going to want it, and it would immediately earn the ire of Hungary to rip it away from them, and probably make them friendly to the French. Let's face it, anyways: The Hungarians opposed any war plan with Germany in 1870 OTL, and probably would IATL, even if they are dragged in kicking or screaming. Bismarck would do well to treat them leniently.

I also disagree about Russia not caring about Czech irredentism. The Slav Congress was held in Prague only twenty-two years ago, and the Czechs were certainly considered Slavs, and in 1870, the Pan-Slav movement was still relevant in Russia. Is Russia going to annex Bohemia? Hell no. Of course not. It won't succeed, but maybe it'll force Germany to admit Bohemia as a member of the Germany Empire on equal terms to other the kingdoms. Perhaps with a Wittelsbach king (echoing back to the Winter King of the Thirty Years War). Bohemia might even get a fair point of autonomy, it's own Ausgleich of sorts. Just speaking as a devils advocate: even if you have a Russo-German alliance, there is no reason for there not to be sticking points. It makes it more interesting than the "German-Russian-Italian alliance carves up Austria-Hungary, is economically powerful, and wins it's war against France with no problems at all!" I could definitely see Czech irredentism as a sticking point and might see Bismarck from refraining from it's full annexation. It would certainly still join the German Empire... just an interesting point. Allies still have disagreements. An independent Bohemia would make an interesting junior ally, of course, alongside Hungary... but those borders would be quite ugly.

In this scenario, does Hungary end up a Republic or Kingdom? I would assume a Kingdom (possibly without a King, ala Horthy's kingdom), given it is under German and Russian tutelage (with a new king, of course), but Gyula Andrássy, after seeing his advice of neutrality spurned in Vienna, might seek to fully break the ties between crown and altar, and declare the Second Hungarian Republic.

 

[archaeogeek]

It makes it more interesting than the "German-Russian-Italian alliance carves up Austria-Hungary, is economically powerful, and wins it's war against France with no problems at all!"

Yeah, but it doesn't fit with the typical bland fare of ridiculous space-filling empires we get from Eurofed out of habit.