Kuhlmann is immediately removed by the Kaiser at the urging of III. OHL, German industrial interests, and the Reichstag majority. Germany continues the war. The Reich will never accept a peace that includes the restoration of Belgian neutrality or the secession of Alscace-Lorraine.
WI: Kühlmann's "Peace Kite" Flies, a Negotiated End to WWI in 1917?
- Thread starter Rex Romae
- Start date
Glad to read people's thoughts coming in!
[1] Woodward, "Peace Kite", 92.
[2] Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon (New York: Routledge, 2016), 202-204.
[3] Woodward, "Peace Kite", 89.
[4] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers," 306.
[5] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 70.
[6] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 67.
Although Germany giving up any of its pre-war territory in exchange for peace appears far-fetched when it was German armies that occupied vast swathes of Belgium and Northern France, both Bethmann-Hollweg and Kühlmann after him implied that compromises and border modifications in Alsace-Lorraine were possible during informal discussions throughout 1917. To what extent these adjustments were envisioned is murky; they have been described as anything from "token" concessions to "nine-tenths" of A-L. Obviously, the French tended to maximize their interpretation of what the Germans were offering either out of wishful thinking or genuine hope that the lost provinces were within their grasp. I do think that Hell would freeze over before France makes peace on terms that do not include the majority of A-L being returned to them, which is where the big-brain colonial exchanges like the Belgian Congo or French Indochina come in (much to Britain's chagrin, which I will also elaborate on below). Making things more complicated was the fact that Britain did not explicitly include A-L as one of its war goals until October 11th, [1] after Kühlmann's speech to the Reichstag on October 9th foreswearing any deal whatsoever. And this in turn was retaliation for Britain's tepid reply to Villalobar on October 6th.
So the final shakedown is one big "maybe"? OHL and the militarists would scream bloody murder for this show of abject surrender, but the idea of trading away (parts of ) A-L was definitely one that floated about in certain circles. This is not to say that there could not be different solutions though. If Germany hops aboard the Wilson train, they could make a lot of noise about self determination and try to force a plebiscite, or grant a greater degree of autonomy to Alsatians and Lorrainers within the framework of the Reich. If I am understanding you @NoMommsen , are you saying that Ludwig III wanted to split up A-L between all the subordinate German Kings within the Empire? That's a wild scheme. My own favourite, and dare I say "poetic", solution is actually for A-L to be granted to Franz Ferdinand's son Maximilian, Duke of Hohenberg, as was speculated on before WWI. [2] What else could be more fitting than for the son of the man whose assassination sparked the War to End All Wars to be granted stewardship of the contested province that did a great deal to prolong the conflict? But the problem remains that France has no reason to accept any of these suggestions, and would prefer to fight on for another year than accept such a hollow peace. I don't think Britain would force France to heel, either.
So the final shakedown is one big "maybe"? OHL and the militarists would scream bloody murder for this show of abject surrender, but the idea of trading away (parts of ) A-L was definitely one that floated about in certain circles. This is not to say that there could not be different solutions though. If Germany hops aboard the Wilson train, they could make a lot of noise about self determination and try to force a plebiscite, or grant a greater degree of autonomy to Alsatians and Lorrainers within the framework of the Reich. If I am understanding you @NoMommsen , are you saying that Ludwig III wanted to split up A-L between all the subordinate German Kings within the Empire? That's a wild scheme. My own favourite, and dare I say "poetic", solution is actually for A-L to be granted to Franz Ferdinand's son Maximilian, Duke of Hohenberg, as was speculated on before WWI. [2] What else could be more fitting than for the son of the man whose assassination sparked the War to End All Wars to be granted stewardship of the contested province that did a great deal to prolong the conflict? But the problem remains that France has no reason to accept any of these suggestions, and would prefer to fight on for another year than accept such a hollow peace. I don't think Britain would force France to heel, either.
[1] Woodward, "Peace Kite", 92.
[2] Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon (New York: Routledge, 2016), 202-204.
This line of argument does seem to be common wisdom for British foreign policy, and indeed the Cabinet's OTL response to Villalobar and Kühlmann supports your view. At the September 24th meeting, Lloyd George, Milner, Bonar Law, and Barnes all agreed that a peace which leaves Germany more powerful than before the war began was a nonstarter, and Haig was adamant that Russian could not be abandoned. However, their mindset was very much one where Britain would fight for Russia only as long as they fought for themselves, [3] and Lloyd George was so exasperated with France and Russia not meeting their Triple Entente obligations by late 1917 that he imagined Britain as the only power still actively waging war against Germany - this was somewhat fair, since the French under Pétain had been staying on the defensive after the mutinies in May while British and Commonwealth troops were dying in droves at Passchendaele. In fact, Lloyd George's negative response towards Kühlmann's communications was at least in part an attempt to rouse Russia's Provisional Government to fight harder, and this rationale lost weight once the October Revolution toppled Kerensky from power. By January of 1918, Lloyd George, Curzon, and Milner were all in favour of a peace that gave Germany free reign in Russia for at least Courland and Lithuania, and even Haig was advocating for an early peace as long as Germany lost its colonies. [4] Unfortunately, the Kühlmann offer was dead in the water by then, and Germany has decided to sign its separate peace with Russia instead to score a victory in the west. We know how that turned out IOTL.
ITTL, my idea is that an initially positive - if hesitant and skeptical - reception by Britain to Kühlmann's proposal at least allows both the Entente and Central Powers to sit down at a table and figure out the finer details of what a lasting peace would actually look like, since neither alliance bloc was forthcoming with their precise aims during the war itself. They don't have to reach an immediate agreement and could spend months arguing...but as times goes on, Britain's willingness to cut a deal increases, and a fine equilibrium is reached where German moderates still have an open diplomatic channel to Britain right as Lloyd George, Milner, Haig, et al. are finally convinced that sacrificing Russia is worth Belgium and A-L. I agree the Peace Resolution's stance of status quo ante bellum was impossible, but this is why I suggested the exchange of colonies, German reparations to Belgium, and so forth. I don't think a timeline where Kühlmann succeeds is one that leads to the balance of power returning to its pre-war configuration, and Germany almost certainly benefits relative to 1914. The fact that there was significant sentiment at the highest levels of French and British civilian leadership for peace negotiations in late 1917 even given this sobering consideration, after the US already entered the war, was surprising to me. It turned a lot of my usual assumptions about WWI on its head and is partly why I am so drawn to the idea of a Kühlmann peace.
ITTL, my idea is that an initially positive - if hesitant and skeptical - reception by Britain to Kühlmann's proposal at least allows both the Entente and Central Powers to sit down at a table and figure out the finer details of what a lasting peace would actually look like, since neither alliance bloc was forthcoming with their precise aims during the war itself. They don't have to reach an immediate agreement and could spend months arguing...but as times goes on, Britain's willingness to cut a deal increases, and a fine equilibrium is reached where German moderates still have an open diplomatic channel to Britain right as Lloyd George, Milner, Haig, et al. are finally convinced that sacrificing Russia is worth Belgium and A-L. I agree the Peace Resolution's stance of status quo ante bellum was impossible, but this is why I suggested the exchange of colonies, German reparations to Belgium, and so forth. I don't think a timeline where Kühlmann succeeds is one that leads to the balance of power returning to its pre-war configuration, and Germany almost certainly benefits relative to 1914. The fact that there was significant sentiment at the highest levels of French and British civilian leadership for peace negotiations in late 1917 even given this sobering consideration, after the US already entered the war, was surprising to me. It turned a lot of my usual assumptions about WWI on its head and is partly why I am so drawn to the idea of a Kühlmann peace.
[3] Woodward, "Peace Kite", 89.
[4] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers," 306.
The relatively harsh terms I imposed on Austria-Hungary was mostly taken from the surprisingly generous concessions Charles I promised to Britain, France, and Italy during the Sixtus Affair, which included the aforementioned withdrawal from Serbia, recognition of French claims to A-L, and support for an independent Belgium. Meanwhile, the cessation of Austrian Galicia to the Kingdom of Poland was something Czernin himself proposed if Germany would yield A-L, [5] which I personally believe is necessary in some way shape or form for the Peace Kite to fly at all. I have read that Charles I himself wanted to be crowned King of Poland, but I doubt OHL was in the mood to entertain Habsburg dynastic ambitions after Habsburg military failures. Archduke Charles Stephen and his son Karl Albrecht are two of the most common names thrown around as potential Kings of Poland, but are there any others I should be aware of?
I actually have to respectfully differ on the treatment of Romania vs Serbia. Neither Czernin nor Kühlmann's communications with the Entente mentioned Romania, implicitly consigning the nation to be within the Central Powers' sphere of influence, while Sixtus (quite absurdly IMO) told the French that Serbia could not only recover its independence but also acquire a coastline, which does suggest a political union of Serbia and Montenegro in some way. [6] Vardar Macedonia is definitely being annexed as "rightful" Bulgarian clay, and probably the Morava Valley as well if the OTL occupation zones are anything to go by, but the rump Serbia that remains might just be allowed to go its own way, albeit with severe restrictions on its military and propaganda organs. I think the Austrian ultimatum in July 1914 provides a pretty good basis for what an "independent" Serbia would look like even if it is no longer an occupied country.
As for Italy, see my comments below!
I actually have to respectfully differ on the treatment of Romania vs Serbia. Neither Czernin nor Kühlmann's communications with the Entente mentioned Romania, implicitly consigning the nation to be within the Central Powers' sphere of influence, while Sixtus (quite absurdly IMO) told the French that Serbia could not only recover its independence but also acquire a coastline, which does suggest a political union of Serbia and Montenegro in some way. [6] Vardar Macedonia is definitely being annexed as "rightful" Bulgarian clay, and probably the Morava Valley as well if the OTL occupation zones are anything to go by, but the rump Serbia that remains might just be allowed to go its own way, albeit with severe restrictions on its military and propaganda organs. I think the Austrian ultimatum in July 1914 provides a pretty good basis for what an "independent" Serbia would look like even if it is no longer an occupied country.
As for Italy, see my comments below!
[5] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 70.
[6] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 67.
Well, in this instance the Entente's power projection lies in the continued pressure of the Western Front and the slow starvation of Germany by sea from the Royal Navy's blockade. It is true that Britain and France were not in a position to directly intervene in Russia or stop Germany from enacting a Brest-Litovsk on the Bolsheviks, but they could make it impossible for the Reich to long enjoy the spoils of their victory in the East (and did do so OTL). The Central Powers getting to permanently maintain their network of puppet states in Poland, Finland, Ukraine, and the Baltics without having to worry about Haig, Foch, and Pershing kicking in the Hindenburg Line is definitely a prize worth haggling for, the question is if Wilhelm and OHL could see that.
I'll certainly have to do more research on the situation in Russia and the new countries formerly part of its empire. The POD itself would be in mid-late September, and as they mostly consist of secret conversations, the butterflies wouldn't really start flapping until the end of 1917, if not later. At a first glance though, I can't see Germany not supporting the anticommunist forces in Finland in order to prop up a pro-German monarch, and Ludendorff would assuredly want to gouge out Russia to compensate for Kühlmann's concessions in Belgium and A-L. Brest-Litvosk might appear merciful in comparison - if I understand the Russian Civil War correctly, wasn't there briefly a Belarusian nationalist movement in 1919? Could the Germans support a pliable puppet here as well to further extend their string of eastern protectorates? If peace has already been made in the west, there's no way Britain and France could restart the war.
I confess that Germany holding on to East Africa was mostly my desire to pay tribute to Lettow-Vorbeck's dazzling and undefeated guerilla campaign that made fools of the French, British, and Commonwealth colonial forces. In all likelihood, Germany is not getting any of its colonies IF it is Britain calling the final shots. Jan Smuts was resolute on the acquisition of German South West Africa for South Africa, and Lloyd George was willing to concede financial compensation to Germany for the loss of their overseas investments (mostly railways, apparently), [7] but I wonder if the opportunity exists for Kühlmann to play Britain and France off against each other by the latter's willingness to exchange her colonies for A-L, whereas the former's entire modus operandi during the war has been to root out all traces of Germany's global empire. To properly assuage Britain's security concerns, submarine bases in the Indian Ocean seem unlikely to me, and a Cape-Cairo railroad, regardless of practicality, would at least sound good when justifying the Peace Kite to opposition parties at home.
Upon further thought, I do agree that French Indochina is a bridge too far, and there's no way Japan was giving anything back to another beleaguered European empire on the other side of the world; they already beat Russia, they can beat an exhausted Germany too. Perhaps France under Painlevé's leadership exerts influence to create a commercial condominium in the Congo along the lines of Solf's prewar advice? German agents in Switzerland believed that Painlevé was open to trading colonies for A-L, [8] and Africa was the simplest sandbox (pun intended) for any such maneuvers. Solf himself was a big proponent of a negotiated peace, so would undoubtedly throw his weight behind Kühlmann's efforts to seek an equitable settlement for Germany.
[7] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers," 305.
[8] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 79.
Upon further thought, I do agree that French Indochina is a bridge too far, and there's no way Japan was giving anything back to another beleaguered European empire on the other side of the world; they already beat Russia, they can beat an exhausted Germany too. Perhaps France under Painlevé's leadership exerts influence to create a commercial condominium in the Congo along the lines of Solf's prewar advice? German agents in Switzerland believed that Painlevé was open to trading colonies for A-L, [8] and Africa was the simplest sandbox (pun intended) for any such maneuvers. Solf himself was a big proponent of a negotiated peace, so would undoubtedly throw his weight behind Kühlmann's efforts to seek an equitable settlement for Germany.
[7] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers," 305.
[8] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 79.
I have not, unfortunately, if you are referring to The Road Less Travelled. I will add it to my reading list if I make this scenario into a full timeline though. Did Zelikow have any insights on what the terms of a Peace Kite might look like that I have not mentioned here?
This actually works pretty well! If Austria-Hungary is setting the boundaries of its expansion to end at a de facto Serbian vassal state, it stands to reason that its forces would evacuate from Albania as well. Serbia is clearly not in a position to compete against Italy for influence, and Greece is likely facing domestic turmoil over being dragged into WWI without the payoff of victory, which gives Italy the green light to assert its domination of Albania about 20 years earlier than OTL. Still a far cry from Trentino, Trieste, or Fiume in the eyes of nationalists, but at least it wraps up a loose end. Maybe TTL's fascist movement gets started by recruiting disgruntled Italian veterans to combat insurgents in Vlorë and the Albanian countryside?
Alsace-Lorraine is a big (very big) question mark, but Kühlmann did not undertake his diplomatic offensive empty-handed - he had already secured Wilhelm's support for his initiative at the Bellevue Crown Council, and even Ludendorff agreed that in the event of such a peace, the High Seas Fleet would not put naval bases in Belgian coastal cities. [9] Kühlmann wanted mutual neutrality guarantees for Belgium that guarded against Britain and France as well as Germany, which a majority of Belgians - according to a survey done in the middle of the war! - was in favour of. [10] Given the staunchly unaligned stance adopted by Belgium during the interwar period, this doesn't seem implausible. Likewise, the Peace Resolution passed by the Reichstag indicates to me that they wouldn't mind a treaty which sees Belgium freed, as that was the essence of "no annexations". It is possible that Hindenburg and OHL talks Wilhelm II into adopting a more hardline stance in the hopes of securing a more decisive victory in 1918, and I admit that in the range of potential ATL outcomes its not all that unlikely given the difficult personalities we're working with here, but everything I have posited in so far had actually been approved by Germany's leadership at one point or another in 1917. What's more, its unlikely the Reichstag, the Kaiser, and other German elites would have been kept unawares of how the negotiations are proceeding, so at worst Kühlmann is told to harden his stance by Wilhelm II, rather than fired immediately (a move that would only show public weakness to the Entente).
[9] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 80.
[10] Palo, "Belgium's Response", 586.
[9] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace", 80.
[10] Palo, "Belgium's Response", 586.
Yep, something alike would be fine, IMHO esp. some kinda 'timetable' (as exactly as possibel) to put the political/diplomatical action in proper relation to the militaryly events.
In general : GREAT IDEA sofar though I haven't read on all the sources you offered and reviewed possible other sources sitting on my shelfs and hard drives possibly fitting this scenario yet.
I'd love to check out the sources you have (if they're in English, alas I cannot read German)! Here's a brief timeline of how things could conceivably turn out ITTL until the end of 1917:
Kühlmann's "Peace Kite", TLDR:
I'm learning quite a lot from the comments here! Next up on my research reading list is an article about 1918 German operations in the Eastern Baltic to see exactly what they had planned.
Kühlmann's "Peace Kite", TLDR:
- July 19th, the Reichstag passes the "Peace Resolution" on the basis of no annexations or indemnities.
- July 31st, the Third Battle of Ypres, also called the Battle of Passchendaele, begins under Marshal Haig's leadership.
- August 1st, Pope Benedict XV publishes the Papal Peace Note that calls for, among other things, a free Belgium.
- August 8, Kühlmann takes over the Reich's Foreign Office from Zimmermann.
- August 23rd-25th, the Count de Salis and nuncio Pacelli exchange Britain's inquiry into German intentions over Belgium.
- September 11th, the Bellevue Crown Council grants Kühlmann permission to seek peace with Britain.
- September 13th, the Kornilov Affair fizzles out with a whimper as Kerensky loses his grip over the Bolsheviks.
- September 18th, Kühlmann's "peace kite" is delivered to Britain by Villalobar. {Possible POD: Kühlmann ensures German willingness to evacuate Belgium is properly communicated}
- September 24th, a Cabinet meeting between Lloyd George and his ministers comes close to accepting Villalobar's proposal for peace talks.
- September 25th, Lloyd George and Painlevé meet at Boulogne to discuss the German olive branch. {Butterfly #1: Britain and France agree to begin tentative discussions for peace}
- October 6th, Lloyd George delivers his response to Kühlmann. {IOTL, this response was a passive rejection that Villalobar didn't even bother to forward to the Germans}
- October 9th, Kühlmann addresses the Reichstag on the question of a compromise peace. {ITTL, Kühlmann would drop the bombshell that legitimate negotiations are taking shape}
- October 24th, the Battle of Caporetto begins, shattering the Isonzo stalemate and driving the Italians back to the Piave River.
- November 2nd, the Balfour Declaration endorses a Zionist state in Palestine. {Butterfly #2: Inflammatory propaganda is unnecessary in the context of an ongoing diplomatic dialogue}
- November 7th, the October Revolution in Russia overthrows Kerensky's Provisional Government and brings the Bolsheviks to power.
- November 8th, Lenin publishes his Decree on Peace, echoing the Reichstag's principles of no reparations and no annexations.
- November 10th, the Battle of Passchendaele ends with hundreds of thousands dead and no appreciable breakthrough.
- November 17th, the Battle of Jerusalem begins as Britain's Palestine Campaign reaches a crescendo.
- November 19th, the Battle of Caporetto ends with a veritable Italian disaster. {Butterfly #3: OHL could prioritize this "last" offensive much more to gain an advantage in peace talks}
- November 20th, the Battle of Cambrai begins, seeing the first effective use of massed tanks on the battlefield.
- December 6th, the Battle of Cambrai ends after surprising success on the local level, but again without a decisive breakthrough.
- December 15th, an armistice is agreed upon between Germany and the Bolshevik government. {Butterfly #4: Kühlmann will likely use this threat as leverage to pressure the Entente}
- December 22nd, negotiations at Brest-Litovsk begin, Trotsky presents a stance of "neither war nor peace".
- December 24th-25, Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. {Butterfly #5: If the solders know that peace is a real possibility, a second Christmas Truce or at least ceasefire might occur}
- December 30th, the Battle of Jerusalem ends with the city's fall, Ottoman forces retreat north into Syria.
I'm learning quite a lot from the comments here! Next up on my research reading list is an article about 1918 German operations in the Eastern Baltic to see exactly what they had planned.
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No Naval Units based at these ports other than a coast guard vessel/anti piracy craft or crafts and some police or native troops like Askari from East Africa. This would be more for a continuation of their present trace and companies that could work with the new nations owning the former colonies. Give the British a starting point so they have some experienced people to help them.
IMHO that's the key difficulty, but also the only that really matters.
People here can argue for ages about who would accept what. But that vastly underestimates just how war-weary the common soldiers were on both sides at this point. It doesn't matter what the aristocracy wants or what intellectuals safely in their ivory towers deem neccessary to satisfy honor. Once a cease fire is reached and negotiations start no Tommy is going to want to charge a German trench line again as long as Germany is willing to accept the loss of it's colonies expect East Africa and evacuates the channel coast. They aren't going to give a frack about Serbia or needing to prevent Germany from getting client states in Eastern Europe.
Same goes for German soldiers as long as they don't loose any pre-war territory in Europe and the Entente doesn't make them abandon all their gains in the East.
France isn't going to get AL back, simply since Germans are more willing to fight to hold it, than Britain and France to kick them out.
Nothing else matters to the rank and file. Now while the shooting was still going on and the other side was fighting those considerations aren't that important and as we can see in OTL discipline held. But once a cease-fire is reached, then "War over" becomes the default state of mind and any side ordering it's soldiers to go over the top again for hypothetical gains they don't care about is going to face worse mutinies than France did in May. Also both sides have the example of those mutinies. They'd still fight if the other side demands more and breaks the cease fire first, but only then.
Garrison
Donor
Which is just typical 'lions led by donkeys' mythology. Even at the height of the French mutiny in 1917 the French army was able and willing to fight on the defensive. Continuing the fighting wasn't about some concept of honour it was about the security of France, Britain and Belgium. Having the Germans in the low countries is a knife held to the throat of British Maritime trade. Belgium and occupied France have been brutalized. There's a grave difference between being war weary and being willing to see the Germans effectively win the war. On the flipside any peace that is likely to be acceptable to the Entente will outrage the German leadership. Yes people floated peace ideas in 1917, but as is almost invariably the case the goals of the two sides were incompatible when you got past the vague desire to end the war, which is hardly unique to 1917. Brest-Litovsk and the 1918 Armstice are probably the most relevant examples, showing that such deals only happen when one side has such a clear strategic advantage that the other has no choice but to comply. And speaking of 1918 Foch himself made it clear that he would not countenance shedding any further blood so long as the the Armistice achieved all the Entente's goals.
There is zero chance of a deal in 1917 while the situation on the battlefield remains in flux, what we saw IOTL 1917 was the Entente doing its best to reinvigorate support for the war, and doing so successfully, by laying out a set of war aims that were never going to be compatible with a negotiated peace. And it must be remembered that Britain and France were democracies, had there truly been a desire for 'peace at any price' then the governments could have been brought to heel, its not dissimilar to the myth that in 1940 Churchill kept Britain in the war by little more than his force of personality, it makes for great drama but it bears no resemblance to reality. The idea that a few arrogant politicians and generals kept the war going for the sake of their own honour is a nonsense, certainly at least on the Entente side.
That's if they accept, the moment just a ceasefire is done is now or never
Garrison
Donor
There's no such thing as just a ceasefire, such things are complicated beasts since no one wants to hand the enemy a potential advantage and the idea that after a couple of days of stopping the fighting people will be desperate for peace at any price remains more than a little ridiculous. History is replete with ceasefires that have collapsed and the fighting resumed.
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I think Britain/France would insist upon evacuation of France/Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine first, then do a cease fire/negotiations.
At that point it may be hard to convince Allied soldiers to go over the top for the sake of what happens in Poland or Serbia once a cease fire has been in place for a while.
It would be hard to get Germany to agree to that.
Probably the best window for a peace settlement is post Amiens August 1918 but before the Bulgarian collapse, in this TL, Ludendorff is sacked, commits suicide, resigns, and an armistice is agreed to as follows, followed by a peace conference, something like:
Germany evacuates Belgium/France/Alsace-Lorraine
Germany evacuates East Africa (Britain to ship home)
Germany surrenders all submarines, two engine aircraft. air ships, and artillery over 150 mm.
Germany evacuates from Caucasus, No further advances in the east.
German sea commerce not allowed outside Baltic/Black seas. (blockade still in place, except in Baltic)
All Allied POWs released
All German enlisted men and civilians released (German officers still held)
(similar such terms for the German Allies)
(the Allies get their big objectives and improve their security ahead of a peace conference)
Garrison
Donor
Problem is that might actually be worse than OTL owing to the blockade still being in place and in 1917 they still think there's a chance they could win. Even a more realistic leadership in 1917, and that's a stretch, is still probably going to go for one last roll of the dice on the battlefield if only to gain a stronger position in the negotiations. It's why successful agreements to end wars are so rare, everyone wants to make a deal, just so long as they have the upper hand in the negotiations.
Other problem for a peace in the west in 1917 is the Germans have pulled back behind the Siegfriedstellung/Hindenburg Line and are convinced its impenetrable, and until the Entente could bring to bear the firepower they had available in 1918 they are more or less right. Even if new leadership goes on the defensive in the West they will still want to shatter the next Entente offensive, at which point they will doubtless succumb to their own desire for one last offensive.
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So I've done some reading on German ambitions in the east, and as @Karelian pointed out, Murmansk (and Archangelsk) were chock-full of food, coal, munitions, etc. sent to Russia by British ships; 12,000 tons of explosives and 200,000 tons of other war materiel were stockpiled in Archangelsk alone by the end of 1917. Reflecting their importance as vital supply depots, 23,000 Entente troops were stationed between the two port cities even after the October Revolution, which caused consternation for the Germans and Bolsheviks alike. In Finland proper, Germany found the troops to assist Mannerheim in taking power OTL with an ongoing Western Front, so I don't foresee drastic butterflies during the Finnish Civil War itself. What might change is the aftermath of Germany stabilizing its protectorate - Frederick Charles of Hesse needed to secure his authority as King of Finland, OHL was unlikely to let the Entente foothold in Murmansk overstay their welcome, and the Bolshevik Reds remained the Reich's ideological nemesis. All these outstanding issues have to be resolved, and if Germany has secured peace in the west, a military solution seems the most straightforward option in the east.
Besides the Kaiser himself, three power players decided German foreign policy in the Baltics: OHL, represented by Ludendorff; the Naval Office, represented by Holtzendorff, the man who declared the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare; and the Foreign Office, represented by Kühlmann, whose star would have either have risen very high or been greatly tarnished for making a compromise peace with the Entente. Holtzendorff was against a drastic commitment against the Bolsheviks as long as the Atlantic was an active war zone, but TTL that would not have been a concern. Likewise, Kühlmann preferred to deal with Lenin, seeing the Soviets as the best way to weaken Russia in the long term - though even his attitude was one that wished for the communists to "fry in their own fat". On the other hand, it goes without saying that Wilhelm II detested the Reds (a Crown Council at Bad Homburg on Feburary 13th, 1918 OTL had him bluntly state that the Bolsheviks should be "beaten to death"), while Ludendorff in typical fashion was not far behind his Kaiser. With no need to prioritize operations in the Atlantic and Kühlmann's moderate path having already gotten its time of day TTL, its very plausible that the militarists in OHL get their say in Russia with Wilhelm II's blessings.
IOTL, OHL drew up a plan called Operation Schlußstein to take and secure Petrograd and Kronstadt before striking northwards to capture Murmansk, acquire its supplies, and neutralize the Entente presence therein. 50,000 troops were assigned to this operation, though the number could be higher if OHL was not strapped for manpower in the west. As part of this scheme, the Germans would help Finland annex East Karelia, Kola Bay, and Murmansk (including a strategic railroad that connected the harbour to Petrograd). However, Wilhelm II also preferred to see the Bolsheviks and Finns cooperate against the Entente in Russia, and the ever-wily Lenin was walking a fine line between inviting British warships to guard Murmansk and weighing the utilitarian value of fighting alongside the Germans so as to preserve the Revolution. The three-way standoff between the Bolsheviks, Entente, and Finland was a fraught one, and whichever way Germany ended up leaning would most probably come out on top. IOTL, Lenin agreed to joint military action against in Murmansk in August 10th, 1918, when Germany was clearly losing the war - in a Peace Kite TL, its all but guaranteed that the Reds would try to collaborate with the Germans, but we might see a split in the soviets between those in favour of cooperation with the Anglo-French intervention against Germany and those loyal to the Bolshevik party line. Not that it would have saved the communists, since commanders like Hoffmann were intent on marching into Petrograd regardless of Lenin's wishes, the High Seas Fleet possessed more than enough firepower to overwhelm the Kronstadt sailors should it come to a battle, and OHL was in contact with Russian monarchists like Colonel Durnov and Alexander Trepov to discuss the future of a post-Bolshevik Russia. They advanced the claim of Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovich, whose son was the colourful Dmitri Pavlovich that helped Felix Yusupov assassinate Rasputin, albeit only after Nicholas II and his family had been shot.
Much of the above information is taken from this source:
Besides the Kaiser himself, three power players decided German foreign policy in the Baltics: OHL, represented by Ludendorff; the Naval Office, represented by Holtzendorff, the man who declared the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare; and the Foreign Office, represented by Kühlmann, whose star would have either have risen very high or been greatly tarnished for making a compromise peace with the Entente. Holtzendorff was against a drastic commitment against the Bolsheviks as long as the Atlantic was an active war zone, but TTL that would not have been a concern. Likewise, Kühlmann preferred to deal with Lenin, seeing the Soviets as the best way to weaken Russia in the long term - though even his attitude was one that wished for the communists to "fry in their own fat". On the other hand, it goes without saying that Wilhelm II detested the Reds (a Crown Council at Bad Homburg on Feburary 13th, 1918 OTL had him bluntly state that the Bolsheviks should be "beaten to death"), while Ludendorff in typical fashion was not far behind his Kaiser. With no need to prioritize operations in the Atlantic and Kühlmann's moderate path having already gotten its time of day TTL, its very plausible that the militarists in OHL get their say in Russia with Wilhelm II's blessings.
IOTL, OHL drew up a plan called Operation Schlußstein to take and secure Petrograd and Kronstadt before striking northwards to capture Murmansk, acquire its supplies, and neutralize the Entente presence therein. 50,000 troops were assigned to this operation, though the number could be higher if OHL was not strapped for manpower in the west. As part of this scheme, the Germans would help Finland annex East Karelia, Kola Bay, and Murmansk (including a strategic railroad that connected the harbour to Petrograd). However, Wilhelm II also preferred to see the Bolsheviks and Finns cooperate against the Entente in Russia, and the ever-wily Lenin was walking a fine line between inviting British warships to guard Murmansk and weighing the utilitarian value of fighting alongside the Germans so as to preserve the Revolution. The three-way standoff between the Bolsheviks, Entente, and Finland was a fraught one, and whichever way Germany ended up leaning would most probably come out on top. IOTL, Lenin agreed to joint military action against in Murmansk in August 10th, 1918, when Germany was clearly losing the war - in a Peace Kite TL, its all but guaranteed that the Reds would try to collaborate with the Germans, but we might see a split in the soviets between those in favour of cooperation with the Anglo-French intervention against Germany and those loyal to the Bolshevik party line. Not that it would have saved the communists, since commanders like Hoffmann were intent on marching into Petrograd regardless of Lenin's wishes, the High Seas Fleet possessed more than enough firepower to overwhelm the Kronstadt sailors should it come to a battle, and OHL was in contact with Russian monarchists like Colonel Durnov and Alexander Trepov to discuss the future of a post-Bolshevik Russia. They advanced the claim of Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovich, whose son was the colourful Dmitri Pavlovich that helped Felix Yusupov assassinate Rasputin, albeit only after Nicholas II and his family had been shot.
Much of the above information is taken from this source:
- Herwig, Holger H. “German Policy in the Eastern Baltic Sea in 1918: Expansion or Anti- Bolshevik Crusade?” Slavic Review 32, no. 2 (1973): 339–57. https://doi.org/10.2307/2495967.
Again, this all took place in OTL August 1918! The only reason that Operation Schlußstein did not come to pass was...due to negotiations between the Foreign Office and the Bolsheviks that tied the army and navy's hands time and again, delaying the commencement of the attack on Petrograd and Kronstadt from the 19th, to the 29th, then to September 4th. So, far from German diplomats being unable or unwilling to contravene OHL's warmonger tendencies, here's an example of the Reich choosing the pen over the sword despite the earnest influence of men such as Ludendorff, Hoffmann, Boedicker, and Leopold of Bavaria.
Assuming that Operation Schlußstein or an ATL equivalent launches successfully after Kühlmann makes peace with the Entente, the Bolsheviks would be done for. Operation Faustschlag had shown the Red Army's crippling weakness, and Mannerheim's Finns could lend additional support to secure Petrograd and Murmansk. Ludendorff gabbled on about how Brest-Litovsk could be reversed once Russia was again a monarchy, with at least Ukraine and the Crimea to be returned if not more, but that seems quite fantastical. If Grand Duke Paul took the throne, he would become Paul II, but nothing about his OTL record suggests that he would be a figure of importance. I suppose there's a long shot here to save Nicholas II (who frankly doesn't deserve it) and his family (who do). Besides the hapless Romanovs, there were also infamous German sympathizers like Pyotyr Krasnov whose faction of Cossacks would attach themselves to any invasion. However, I am of the firm opinion that the historically significant Whites like Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenich would have rebuffed German entreaties as long as Brest-Litovsk went unrevised in Russia's favour; these were Great Russian nationalists, unwilling to concede an inch even to fellow anti-Bolshevik ethnic separatists, and they despised Lenin's gang as German puppets who sold out their motherland. In no world would they agree to collaborate with Ludendorff's campaign or accept a figurehead Tsar propped up by German bayonets.
Assuming that Operation Schlußstein or an ATL equivalent launches successfully after Kühlmann makes peace with the Entente, the Bolsheviks would be done for. Operation Faustschlag had shown the Red Army's crippling weakness, and Mannerheim's Finns could lend additional support to secure Petrograd and Murmansk. Ludendorff gabbled on about how Brest-Litovsk could be reversed once Russia was again a monarchy, with at least Ukraine and the Crimea to be returned if not more, but that seems quite fantastical. If Grand Duke Paul took the throne, he would become Paul II, but nothing about his OTL record suggests that he would be a figure of importance. I suppose there's a long shot here to save Nicholas II (who frankly doesn't deserve it) and his family (who do). Besides the hapless Romanovs, there were also infamous German sympathizers like Pyotyr Krasnov whose faction of Cossacks would attach themselves to any invasion. However, I am of the firm opinion that the historically significant Whites like Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenich would have rebuffed German entreaties as long as Brest-Litovsk went unrevised in Russia's favour; these were Great Russian nationalists, unwilling to concede an inch even to fellow anti-Bolshevik ethnic separatists, and they despised Lenin's gang as German puppets who sold out their motherland. In no world would they agree to collaborate with Ludendorff's campaign or accept a figurehead Tsar propped up by German bayonets.
Only if you focus on these 10 words in a post which is much larger than that tiny snippet. The rest of the sentence attached to that quote explains how the British stated their support for a French Alsace-Lorraine on October 11th, multiple weeks after the POD on September 18th when Kühlmann sent his communiqué to Britain via Villalobar. Lloyd George's declaration was in response to Kühlmann himself ruling out any notion of compromise when he thought his initiative had failed, so it only seems reasonable that in an ATL where discussions are taking place that this sequence of events does not happen. And as long as neither politician makes a definitive statement on A-L, there's wiggle room to play with.
The rest of the sentence attached to that quote explains how the British stated their support for a French Alsace-Lorraine on October 11th, multiple weeks after the POD on September 18th when Kühlmann sent his communiqué to Britain via Villalobar. Lloyd George's declaration was in response to Kühlmann himself ruling out any notion of compromise when he thought his initiative had failed, so it only seems reasonable that in an ATL where discussions are taking place that this sequence of events does not happen. And as long as neither politician makes a definitive statement on A-L, there's wiggle room to play with.I do agree that once word gets to the soldiers that peace talks are taking place, the willingness of the common rank-and-file to go on wasteful offensives would drop drastically. My reading of the available sources suggests to me that, in Europe, the British just cared about Belgium, the French about A-L. However, what troubles me is that even when the points of contention are reduced to these two hotspots, Kühlmann's Peace Kite only addressed one of them. I genuinely do not believe that the French would settle without regaining the lost provinces - the demands of the mutineers in May 1917 were for peace...and the return of A-L. The troops who threatened to go to the Chamber of Deputies to force negotiations were the same as those who refused to sign "shameful treaties", units that spoke with language bordering on treason and revolution expected the Boches to "accept a peace corresponding to the sacrifices that we have made and satisfactory to our honour". Its paradoxical how the French poilu were insisting on peace this instant while at the same time believing that said peace would include Alsace and Lorraine as a matter of course. While Germany was willing to partially concede A-L, would they have conceded enough to satisfy France? Would Britain choose to support or bear down on its ally?
I got the quotes of the mutinying French soldiers here:
I got the quotes of the mutinying French soldiers here:
- Smith, Leonard V. “War and ‘Politics’: The French Army Mutinies of 1917.” War in History 2, no. 2 (1995): 180–201. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26004437.
I don't think that's a fair assessment of @Drizzt 's argument. The war was about the security of France, Britain, and Belgium - and that was exactly what Kühlmann was putting on the table. As I've stated, the Germans were offering to evacuate the Low Countries, and no less a Prussian militarist than Ludendorff had agreed that there would be no High Seas Fleet bases in Belgium. This wasn't some minor or renegade German official making secret entreaties behind the backs of his compatriots, this was the head of the Foreign Office receiving the backing of both OHL and Wilhelm II to make an implicit invitation for further negotiations. I also believe that you are overstating how incompatible the Entente and Central Powers' visions for peace were:
From Fest, "British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War", pg. 301.
From Stevenson, "The Failure of Peace," pgs. 80-81.
From Woodward, "Kühlmann Peace Kite," pgs. 92-93.
I think it is eminently clear that both Britain and France were willing to talk with Germany, and Britain was sufficiently exhausted that preventing German domination of Russia was no longer a hill for British soldiers to die on. Now, yes, obviously these thoughts of peace went nowhere, so the obstacles to be overcome were tangible and difficult, but its not as though the conceit of "peace in the west in exchange for a free hand in the east" was inconceivable - it was literally on the verge of being agreed upon at multiple points throughout late 1917 and early 1918!
The logic that popular pressure could have forced a pro-peace government into power, so the fact that no such pressure came into being must mean there was no desire for peace is only partly true IMO. How could the public demand acceptance of peace terms when they had no idea what the terms are in the first place? Or, indeed, that there were terms being offered at all? I cannot speak to what the Entente leaders thought of honour, but I do know that they deliberately suppressed Kühlmann's olive branch from the public for fear of demands to end the war:
From Fest, "British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War", pg. 302.
From Stevenson, "The Failure of Peace," pg. 83.
From Woodward, "Kühlmann Peace Kite," pg. 87.
Nothing whatsoever was said of Russia, Serbia, Romania, Italy, the Ottomans, any of Germany's African colonies, or indeed the matter of reparations and indemnities. The lynchpins of the Peace Kite were Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and Kühlmann was willing to compromise on both matters, Belgium more than A-L. I don't blame the Entente for not publishing Germany's proposed offer since the Germans themselves did not, but Anglo-French apprehension that a minimalist peace would seize the minds of their armies and populace was very real. Just because Britain and France did not face violent revolutions did not mean that its citizens would blindly reject a peace built on moderate terms.
I'm not sure that this "peace" makes a lot of sense. Not only did the British Cabinet meetings in 1917 never mention such severe military restrictions, there was no reason for the Germans to accept this ridiculous ultimatum to unilaterally disarm and subject themselves to starvation as the situation on the frontlines stood going into 1918. If the Entente was so tactless as to make these demands in public peace negotiations, Kühlmann could easily portray the British and French warmongers as the unreasonable party for the world to see. What do the Germans gain out of such a settlement that they did not or could not IOTL?
EDIT: I just reread your post and saw that this is for a hypothetical settlement/surrender in 1918 once Germany was cooked by the Hundred Days Offensive. Honestly, I don't think anything could have saved or retrieved the situation for the Central Powers at this point, and any agreement made after this date would be a victor's peace imposed by the Entente. And for what will come of such a peace, we only need to open the history books.
EDIT: I just reread your post and saw that this is for a hypothetical settlement/surrender in 1918 once Germany was cooked by the Hundred Days Offensive. Honestly, I don't think anything could have saved or retrieved the situation for the Central Powers at this point, and any agreement made after this date would be a victor's peace imposed by the Entente. And for what will come of such a peace, we only need to open the history books.
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Because they is the blow that crumble your house of cards,Kühlmann would be sacked for itOnly if you focus on these 10 words in a post which is much larger than that tiny snippet.
Garrison
Donor
And has been pointed out once the German leadership understood just how much Kühlmann was willing to give away they would have repudiated his offer, assuming it was more than just mischief making. Strikes me such an outrageous capitulation is only being offered in the certainty that it won't be taken seriously.
But your logic only stacks up if there was a genuine 'peace party' waiting in the wings, so perhaps you could name these politicians? You also continue to talk about disillusion with the war, which is largely the product of post war writers in the 1930s spinning their own anti-war narrative. They suppressed it because they guessed, probably correctly, that it was intended to stir up trouble. The notion that the British are somehow so exhausted that they will give in because of a few promises from the Germans is just a continuation of the idea that the western democracies are weak willed and can be persuaded to throw in the towel at the first opportunity.
But why would he be sacked if he had the approval of Wilhelm II and the reluctant approval of Ludendorff?
@Rex Romae I appreciate the efforts you went to write this premise and the numerous, detailed responses to this thread, especially the multiple sources you provided to support your points, something that seems to be lacking from the people who are disagreeing on the possibility of peace.
Because we think as the agents at the time,one thing is a peace envoy, another throwing away an imperial state away
The Entente will not allow for a German puppet Russia, the Germans will have to agree to end all offensives on the Eastern Front if they want peace and I defy any German commander to rally his troops to go back to the frontlines again once a peace deal has been reached with the rest of the Entente. Also you mentioned July 1917 which means the Bolsheviks aren't in power yet, which means that the Provisional Government is present at the peace conference.
This only adds on the argument that a negotiated peace is impossible, both sides have demands that are not compatible with others' demands.
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Garrison
Donor
Because they probably didn't realize the full extent of what was going to be offered, or intended to renege at the first opportunity, or indeed just change their minds because they had a couple of days to think about it. You only have to look at Ludendorff's conduct in 1918, seeking an armistice only to try and change his mind when he realized that the Entente wasn't that naive. I'm sure in the minds of Ludendorff and the Kaiser this was simply a gambit, designed to cause dissent in the enemy ranks, without the slightest intention of delivering on any of the offers.
Haven't you heard?
The Germans, never, ever, ever would have done that.
They didn't have the occupation troops to sustain it.
The Russians were failing on their own.
The Germans had plenty of better things to do with their forces.
The Germans had *no reason* to do it. The Russians had endless space to retreat after Petrograd. Thus by ironclad logic, they never would have.
[OOC: I'm play-acting with you, but that's a summary of the response I got when I posted: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-and-navally-seized-petrograd-in-1917.490252/ ]
Germany could work with the UK after the Bolsheviks with Murmansk and Archangelsk. Have them reach an understanding that the Finns get Murmansk eventually and keeping Archangelsk might be more difficult but setting up a joint way to keep it out of the Bolshies hands might be a workable deal. Having a White Russian force able to be supported up there by both powers, UK with Naval and Germany with land forces and both having supplies.
I think the next research article I read will be centred on Solf to see what sort of person he was and what his idea of a compromise peace in Africa looked like. I'll also try to get my hands on a copy of Zelikow's The Road Less Travelled, hopefully the book has more details on what the French were willing to concede in return for Alsace-Lorraine.